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ABSTRACT
In the rst chapter of this Thesis, we examine an incumbent monopolists in-
centives to upgrade his durable, network product in the subsequent period while
facing a potential rival who may also produce a version of identical quality. We
show that the incumbent rm may commit not to upgrade because he can charge
su¢ ciently patient, forward looking consumers more in the present market when
entry is certain and compatibility between the competitorsversions is manda-
tory. In fact, his commitment could be an additional factor of ine¢ ciency while
a potential or actual competitive threat could dissolve social optimality. When
sequential, non-drastic innovation occurs with certainty, we show in the second
chapter that the dominant market player may voluntarily support compatibility
when he anticipates a moderately large quality improvement by the competitor for
a fairly general set of assumptions regarding consumers(un)willingness to post-
pone their purchase and the rivals (in)ability to price discriminate between the
di¤erent customersclasses. This happens as strategic pricing allows the dominant
rm to extract more of the higher total expected surplus that emerges when inter-
operability is present. Furthermore, we nd that mandatory compatibility does
not de-facto maximise social welfare, decreases consumer welfare and we identify
no market failure when network e¤ects are not particularly strong. For su¢ ciently
innovative products and although compatibility is not supported by the dominant
rm, consumerswelfare is maximised because of the lower prices that emerge
viii
due to the higher degree of competition that arises when interoperability is not
present. In the third chapter, we consider discrete time, stochastic Research and
Development [R&D] processes where both an initially dominant and a smaller
rival are potential inventors. For su¢ ciently innovative future products, our rst
key result is that the dominant rm invests more when compatibility is present
and voluntarily decides to supply interoperability information. This happens as
the probability that he is the only inventor in the market increases when prod-
ucts are compatible, allowing him to enjoy a higher expected future prot that
outweighs the lost current revenue. For economies whose existing market size is
considerably large, the rival also demands compatibility while this is no longer
true in industries with a relatively smaller number of existing consumers. For
less innovative new versions, the dominant rm rejects compatibility and we also
nd that there is a cuto¤ in network externalities below which the dominant rm
invests more when compatibility is not present. Regarding welfare, we nd that
a laissez faire Competition Law with respect to the Intellectual Property Rights
holders is socially preferable.
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CHAPTER 1
EFFICIENT UPGRADING IN DURABLE NETWORK
GOODS; IS COMMITMENT ALWAYS GOOD?
1.1 Introduction
While competition is in general socially e¢ cient, this chapter identies a scenario
where this may not necessarily be true. In particular, we nd that potential
or actual competition are sources of too frequently introduced new products in
durable network goods markets. Moreoever, we show that although the incumbent
may currently commit not to upgrade, his commitment power may in fact add an
additional source of ine¢ ciency.
The model we use is similar to that of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000). More
specically, we explore a market leaders incentives to provide an upgrade of his
software in the presence of forward looking consumers and a competitor who could
potentially o¤er a good of the same quality. We do this by considering both the
cases when the incumbent may or may not be able to commit to whether he will
sell the superior product in the future period. We also give the rival the power
to o¤er compatibility with the leaders versions. On the demand side, forward
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looking consumers incur both the monetary cost and a cost of learning how to use
any software product. It is the latter cost that determines whether introducing
the new product into the market is socially optimal: society would be better o¤
without it if the social benet from the quality improvement from its introduction
is lower than the social cost and nevertheless, consumers of the old version are
"forced" to purchase it due to network externalities.
Our results recognize potential or actual competition as well as the incum-
bents commitment power as sources of ine¢ ciency. More precisely, although the
introduction of the new product may not be socially e¢ cient, the market leader
will always commit to upgrade if this choice can deter the competitor from in-
vesting. If the rivals entry is certain, the incumbent may commit not to upgrade
because such a choice enables him to charge su¢ ciently patient customers more
in the present market. Furthermore, if the rival cannot price discriminate be-
tween the old and the new users, the incumbents commitment may lead the old
consumers to stick to the old product, although the new version is an important
improvement while social e¢ ciency is obtained when he lacks commitment power.
Thus, forbidding the incumbent to commit may in fact raise social welfare.
1.1.1 Related literature
This chapter links to the literature on durable goods by examining how durability
a¤ects the pricing and innovation behaviour of an incumbent rm and a potential
2
competitor. It also relates to the discussion regarding whether a durable goods
monopolist implements the socially optimal level of technological progress when
he faces potential or actual competition. Waldman (1993, 1996) as well as Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1998) and Choi (1994) examined whether the time inconsistency
problem faced by a durable goods monopolist might be overcome if the rm intro-
duces a new product. Although these papers recognized the linkage between the
present and future market on the monopolists pricing and investment decisions,
they do not allow for potential or actual competition. Hoppe and Lee (2003) show
that the intertempolar linkage may introduce ine¢ ciency in investment if there
is a potential entrant that may also innovate. Unlike Bucovetsky and Chilton
(1986) and Bulow (1986), Hoppe and Lee (2003) consider a competitor who can
come up with a new generation of the good currently supplied by the incumbent
monopolist. They identify limit pricing as a source of ine¢ ciency, and they also
shed light on Microsofts puzzling pricing strategy in Operating systems as a vir-
tual monopolist would charge much more than the technology giant. Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist may use limit pricing for
his network good to deter entry of a potential entrants incompatible product.
Our work di¤ers because, unlike Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), we consider dura-
bility coupled with network externalities, allowing for compatibility between the
competitorsproducts. Meanwhile, contrary to Hoppe and Lee (2003) and Fuden-
berg and Tirole (2000), we no longer identify limit pricing but rather, potential
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or actual competition as a source of ine¢ cieny. Ellison and Fudenberg (2000)
is the paper that is closest to this work. The authors consider a durable goods
monopolists incentives to o¤er an upgrade of his product in the future period. If
consumers are homogeneous, the lack of the rms commitment power is a source
of potential ine¢ ciency because the monopolist always sells the new version in
the second period even if its improvement is negligible and thus, not protable
overall. So, his inablity to commit may hurt his prots as well as social welfare.
This chapter is di¤erent because by adding a rival who could introduce a superior
version in the future just like the market leader, we nd that unlike Ellison and
Fudenberg (2000) where commitment is socially desirable, this is no longer true
in a scenario when competition is present.
1.2 The model
Consider an industry where a software, durable product of quality q1 is currently
supplied by a market leader.1 He is considering whether to upgrade his product in
the next period by selling a good of superior quality q2. The choice of upgrading
does not involve any cost of development as it is assumed that previous investment
provides the incumbent with the technology to launch the new product. The
incumbent knows that there is a serious threat of a rival rm2 that can also
develop a good of the same quality q2 after bearing a xed cost of development F
1We follow Ellison and Fudenberg who also consider quality as a positive, real number q:
2She will be called rival, competitor or entrant interchangeably throughout the paper.
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(F  0).3
In a two period environment, the incumbent sets the price(s) for his product(s)
while he is able to o¤er an upgrade price to old users.4 If he has commitment
power, he also has an additional simultaneous choice to make: whether to commit
to upgrade or not.
At the same time, the competitor needs to decide whether she will enter the
market in the following period. If entry occurs, the two rms engage in price com-
petition (a la Bertrand) and they incur a zero marginal cost of production for all
product versions.5 I investigate both the cases where the rival can price discrim-
inate between the di¤erent consumersclasses and when she cannot while when
rms are indi¤erent, they make a decision that lowers the opponents expected
prots.
On the demand side, consumers are assumed identical and arrive in constant
ows t (t = 1; 2). Customers utility takes the form U=
2P
t=1
t 1V where  is
the common discount factor and V is positively dependent on network e¤ects
captured by the parameter .6 Thus, if the buyer joins a network of mass x
(including himself), the network benet is x: In addition to the monetary cost,
3Imitation of product functionality is consistent with the software industry in the
United States in late 80s. It is also consistent with cases that have recently appeared
in Europe (see for example http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
05/cp120053en.pdfSAS for the SAS Institute Inc. versus World Programming Ltd) verifying
that software product functionality can be imitated.
4This corresponds to the semi-anonymous case in Fudenberg-Tirole (1998).
5This assumption is consistent with the applications in the computer software market indus-
try.
6We follow Ellison and Fudenberg who also assume the same type of utility U. In their paper,
V is linear in money.
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consumers also incur a cost of learning the new technology. Each consumer incurs
a cost c the rst time he starts to use the incumbent monopolists product followed
by an additional lower cost (cu < c) when learning to use a new product.
Customers who arrive in the market in the rst period are assumed to be
forward looking and, depending on their expectations, they may either buy the
initial good immediately after observing its price or postpone their decision to
the future. Their expectations reect the information available to consumers at
the time they are called to make their buying decision and are fully aligned in
equilibrium; that is, they possess perfect foresight. In the second period and if
there is a new product in the market, the old customers are not guaranteed to buy
it because of the durability of the initial version. These customerspurchasing
decision given announced prices resembles a coordination game and can have
multiple equilibria. Following the literature, old consumers coordinate to the
Pareto optimal outcome.7 In the similar coordination problem related to the new
customerspurchasing decisions, the standard assumption is that buyers with the
same preferences act as if they were a single player. Thus, after observing the
prices, they coordinate to what is best for all of them. All consumers make their
purchasing decisions simultaneously where we assume that they prefer a better
than an inferior product even if their net utility is equivalent. Also note that the
same discount factor  applies to all the agents in the economy.
7See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
6
The model makes the strong assumption that the competitorssuperior quality
products are compatible. Thus, a buyer of a high quality good can interact with
all the superior product buyers, independently of whether they purchase it from
the incumbent or the entrant rm. Backward compatibility makes the buyers
of any new product able to open and save a document that was created with
the lower quality product. Thus, the high quality good buyers are part of a
network which also consists of the low quality good users. On the other hand,
non-forward compatibility prevents the buyers of the initial product from working
with documents that are created with the superior version.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Social Welfare
I begin by considering the problem faced by a planner who maximises social
surplus. He needs to decide whether it is socially bential if the new product
is introduced or the old version is used for both periods. In the former case, it
may be e¢ cient if the new product is used either by both the new and the old
consumers or only by the new potential comers.
If all old and new customers use the new product, social welfare is:
WU = 1(q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu) + 2(q2 +   c);
where without loss of generality, the market size in the second period is normalized
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to unity and consumersutility is linear in money. If the new product is introduced
but only the second period customers use it, social welfare is:
WI = 1[(1 + )q1 + (1 + )1   c] + 2(q2 +   c):
If the lower quality product is used for both periods, social welfare is given by
the expression:
WN = 1[(1 + )q1 + 1 +   c] + 2(q1 +   c):
Comparing the above expressions yields the next proposition that summarizes
the socially e¢ cient outcome.
Proposition 1 Let q = q2   q1 denote the quality improvement from the intro-
duction of the new product. The socially e¢ cient outcome is (a) keep the lower
quality good for two periods if a > cu and q < 1cu or if  < cu and q < 1;
(b) use the incompatible regime, that is, introduce the new product but only the
second period potential customers use it if q > 1 and q + 2 < cu and (c)
introduce the new product and everyone uses it in the second period if  > cu and
q > 1cu or if  < cu and q > cu   2:
Think of the case that the network e¤ects are large relative to the adoption
cost ( > cu). It is then benecial for society to maintain the lower quality good if
the cost of learning how to use the new product for the old users exceeds the gain
in every customers second period utility (q < 1cu) and it is socially e¢ cient
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for everyone to purchase the new product if the sign of the inequality is reversed
(q > 1cu). When network e¤ects are weak ( < cu), it is socially optimal
to withhold the superior product when the loss from incompatibility is greater
than the benet the new users enjoy from the new version (q2 < 12).
It is also socially e¢ cient if everyone uses the new product when the quality
improvement and the gains from a larger network are greater than the adoption
cost (q + 2 > cu), whereas it is socially optimal if only the new buyers use it
when the last inequality is reversed. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation
of the socially optimal outcome.
Figure 1.1: The socially optimal outcome: The red area indicates values in the
parameter space where using the old product for two periods is socially optimal.
The yellow area represents parameter values where it is socially e¢ cient if only
the new customers use the new product. The green area captures the case where
it is socially optimal if everyone uses the superior good.
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1.3.2 Market outcome/ Incumbents commitment
I consider a scenario of potential entry when the incumbent has already acquired
the technology allowing him to commit to choose to upgrade in the following
period. I analyze rst the case when entry is certain and the entrant may or may
not have the ability to price discriminate between the old and the new customers.
1.3.2.1 Certain entry/ The rival can price discriminate
The entrant is assumed to be able to costlessly imitate the superior good (F = 0)
and this fact allows her to always enter the market.8 If the incumbent commits to
upgrade, in the second period, Bertrand competition drives all the prices to zero.9
This is no longer true if he commits to keep the initial product. In this case, the
entrant can exploit the quality improvement and charge a strictly positive price
either to the whole market or only to the new comers.10 Since the rst period
potential customersoutside opportunity is higher when the incumbent commits to
sell the superior version, he could charge them more if he committed to maintain
the initial product in the market. Thus, the incumbent could be better-o¤ if he
committed not to upgrade. The next proposition summarizes the incumbents
choice and the equlibrium market outcome for the di¤erent parameter values.
8The same result of certain entry could be alternatively generated if the entrant needed to
bear a xed cost F to develop the product and she could o¤er a superior version with su¢ ciently
smaller adoption cost than the incumbents upgrade.
9A complete characterization of the prices set and the market outcome is given in the Ap-
pendix.
10Again, see the Appendix for a complete characterization of the market outcome and the
prices set.
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Proposition 2 The incumbent always commits not to upgrade. In the second
period, either the whole market (if q+2  cu  0) or only the new comers (if
q + 2   cu < 0) buy the superior rivals version of quality q2: In the former
scenario, old customers buy the new product for free.
The proposition above suggests that in equilibrium, the higher quality good
is always sold in the second period and is purchased either by the whole market
or only by the new customers. This fact already highlights the potential ine¢ -
ciency that may arise in the market as it could be socially benecial if there is no
new product in the economy. The next proposition summarizes the comparison
between the market equilibrum and the socially optimal outcome:
Proposition 3 It is socially optimal if there is no new product in the second
period and nevertheless: (a) both new and old customers buy the rivals superior
product if q + 2   cu  0, q < 1cu (these parameter values imply that
a  cu). (b) only the new potential customers purchase the entrants product if
q + 2   cu < 0; q < 1(these parameter values imply that  < cu).
Society would be better-o¤ if the initial version is used for both periods when
the network benet is relatively large (  cu) and the adoption cost for the
old users exceeds the gain in every customers second period utility (q < 1cu).
Nevertheless, the superior product is always sold in the market and everyone buys
it if the quality improvement and the gains from a larger network are greater than
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the costs of learning how to use it (q+2 cu  0). For relatively weak network
benets compared to the adoption cost ( < cu), it is socially e¢ cient to withhold
the high quality product if the loss from incompatibility is greater than the utility
benet the new users enjoy from the new version (q2 < 12). However, the
entrant sells the superior product and only the new potential customers purchase
it when the cost of learning how to use it for the old users is higher than their
benet form upgrading (q + 2   cu < 0). Therefore, ine¢ ciency may occur
as a result of actual competition when the incumbent can commit to his future
actions and gure 2 represents diagrammatically the potential ine¢ ciency that
may arise in the market.
Figure 1.2: Market outcome and e¢ ciency: The red and yellow shaped areas in
the parameter space represent ine¢ cient use of a new product by all consumers
and only the new users, respectively.
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1.3.2.2 Certain Entry/ The rival cannot price discriminate
If the entrant is unable to price discriminate, the analysis when the incumbent
commits to upgrade leads to the same prices set by the competitors.11 If the in-
cumbent monopolist commits not to upgrade, the entrant needs to decide whether
to serve all the market in the second period or sell the superior product only to
the new comers.12 The next proposition summarizes the incumbents choices as
well as the market equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 4 (a) If q+2  cu < 0 or q+2  cu  0; q1+2 < cu;
2 < cu; the incumbent commits not to upgrade and the entrant serves only the
new comers. (b) If q + 2   cu  0; q1 + 2   cu  0; 2 < cu; the
incumbent commits not to upgrade and the entrant serves the whole market. (c)
If q + 2   cu  0; 2 > cu; the incumbent is indi¤erent between committing
to upgrade or not.
The proposition above suggests that in equilibrium and similar to the case that
the entrant can exercise price discrimination, the higher quality good is always
sold and is purchased either by the whole market or only by the new customers.
Note that under most parameter values, the incumbent commits not to sell the
higher quality good because if he sold the upgrade, actual competition would lower
11See the appendix for the complete characterization of the equilibrium prices and market
outcome.
12Again, the Appendix contains all the di¤erent cases.
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his total prots. The next proposition highlights the potential ine¢ ciency that
may arise in the market.
Proposition 5 A) It is socially optimal if the initial product is used for both
periods and nevertheless, (a) the higher quality product is sold to the whole market
if q + 2   cu  0, q1 + 2   cu  0; q < 1cu. (b) the entrants higher
quality good is sold only to the new customers if q+2  cu < 0; q < 1 or
if q+2  cu  0; q1+2 < cu; 2 < cu and q < 1cu. B) It is socially
optimal for everyone to use the new product but the entrant sells the new product
only to the new potential customers if q+2 cu  0; q1+2 < cu;  < cu.
Thus, there may be a superior product in the market even though society
would be better-o¤without it for the same parameter values as in the case the en-
trant can price discriminate. There is also an additional ine¢ ciency (B): when old
second period customersbenet from using the new product o¤sets their adop-
tion cost and the rst period market size is relatively small, the social optimum
is achieved when everyone uses the new product and nevertheless, the entrant
sells the superior good only to the new buyers. Figure 3 represents the potential
ine¢ ciency that may arise in the market.
1.3.2.3 Potential entry
Consider now the case that the potential entrant needs to pay a xed cost (F > 0)
to develop the superior good. If the incumbent commits to upgrade, the potential
14
Figure 1.3: Market outcome and e¢ ciency: The red and yellow shaped areas in
the parameter space represent ine¢ cient use of a new product. The green area
represents the additional ine¢ ciency when the new product is purchased only by
the new comers while it is socially optimal for everyone to use a new version.
entrant is deterred to enter the market.13 If the incumbent commits not to up-
grade, the analysis is identical with the scenario when the entrant can costlessly
imitate the high-quality good under the condition that her development cost is
not prohibitively high and this guarantees her entry.14 The incumbent compares
the prot gained by her commitment to either withhold the high quality good or
sell it in the second period and the next result summarizes his choice as well as the
market outcome. Note that these results are independent of whether the entrant
has the ability to price discriminate:
Proposition 6 The incumbent monopolist always commits to sell the superior
13The post-entry game is analyzed in the appendix.
14See the appendix for the characterization of the equilibrium prices and prots.
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product in the second period and the potential entrant is deterred to enter. If a)
q + 2   cu  0; all the market purchases the upgrade, b) q + 2   cu < 0;
only the new customers upgrade.
The incumbent rms choice to always commit to upgrade may be socially
ine¢ cient as it could be socially optimal if there was no upgrade in the market.
This potential ine¢ ciency is highlighted in the next result.
Proposition 7 It is socially optimal for the low quality good to be sold in the
market in both periods and nevertheless, (a) the incumbent commits to sell the
upgrade and the whole market buys it when q + 2   cu  0 and q < 1cu,
(b) the incumbent commits to sell the superior good and only the new customers
purchase it when q + 2   cu < 0 and q < 1.
Note that ine¢ ciency may arise for the same parameter values as in the case
when the entrants entry is certain and she can price discriminate between the old
and the new users.
1.3.3 Market outcome/ No commitment for the incumbent
In this subsection, I will discuss the case when the incumbent rm faces the threat
of entry and cannot commit to its future actions.
Consider rst the case when the potential rivals entry is certain and she also
has the ability to price discriminate between the di¤erent consumersclasses. Due
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to Bertrand competition, the incumbents second period prots are zero inde-
pendently of whether he decides to sell the low or the superior product. In this
scenario, he will choose to sell the upgrade in the market, because otherwise, the
entrant would enjoy positive prots. Therefore, there will be a high quality good
in the second period sold by both competitors and this may be socially ine¢ cient
when is optimal for society if there is no new product. In fact, the ine¢ ciency
range is the same as in the commitment case analyzed in the previous subsection
(proposition 3).
If the entrant lacks the power to price discriminate, the range of ine¢ ciency
is the same as in the scenario when the incumbent has commitment power except
for one additional case: while it may be socially optimal if all customers purchase
the superior product, unlike the scenario that the incumbent lacks the power to
commit, the market leads the old customers to keep the initial version when the
incumbent can commit (q + 2   cu  0; q1 + 2   cu < 0;  < cu).
Therefore, contrary to the monopolistic environment where social optimality is
achieved under the incumbent rms commitment power, lack of commitment
may raise social welfare when the market is open to competition.
Consider now the situation when the development cost for the entrant is posi-
tive. The entrant rm would not invest in developing the higher quality good. To
see this fact, consider the post entry game. The incumbent would be indi¤erent
between selling the lower or the superior product because (due to Bertrand com-
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petition) his prots would be zero in both cases. He would then prefer to upgrade,
because this would guarantee that the entrant would incur losses. The potential
entrant anticipates the incumbents post entry behaviour and she rationally does
not pay the xed development cost. This fact allows the incumbent to be the
sole supplier of the upgrade in the second period. Thus, the range of ine¢ ciency
appears to be exactly the same as in the case when the incumbent can commit to
his future actions. To summarize, the ine¢ ciency range when the incumbent rm
enjoys or lacks commitment power and the xed development cost for the entrant
is strictly positive or zero, respectively, are highlighted in the following table:
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Commitment for the in-
cumbent
No commitment for the
incumbent
Monopoly Social e¢ ciency Ine¢ ciency: The
monopolist always
upgrades even though
it could be socially
optimal if there is no
upgrade in the market
Potential Competition
(F>0)
Ine¢ ciency: The
same range as in the
monopoly case under
no commitment
Ine¢ ciency: Same
range as in the
monopoly non-
commitment case
Actual competition/
The entrant can price
discriminate
Ine¢ ciency: The
same range as in the
monopoly case under
no commitment
Ine¢ ciency: Same
range in the monopoly
non-commitment case
Actual competition/
The entrant cannot
price discriminate
Ine¢ ciency: The range
of ine¢ ciency is larger
than the monopoly
non-commitment case.
Same range of in-
e¢ ciency as in
the monopoly non-
commitment case
19
1.4 Applications/ Conclusion
This chapter serves as a small step towards understanding the role of a competitive
threat in the frequency of new product introductions in durable network goods.
The message of this work is that better versions of such products may arise too
often and this ine¢ ciency may be due to potential or actual competition. Going
one step further, it is suggested that it may be benecial for society if the incum-
bent is forbidden to commit to whether he will upgrade or not. This contrasts
sharply with the monopolistic scenario where the rst best is achieved under the
rms commitment power.
The model applies to scenarios where an incumbent monopolist is threatened
by a potential competitor and is considering whether to upgrade his product in
the subsequent period. It predicts that the superior good is always introduced in
the market and this may not be socially benecial. Such a scenario may occur
in technology markets where we observe frequent new versions sold either by the
same rm or a competitor. A prime example that ts proposition 2 comes from
the spreadsheet market for personal computers. In 1988, Lotus was the dominant
player with 70% market share.15 In 1989 it sold its software program 1-2-3 version
3 in IBM high-end computers16 and also committed not to upgrade in theWindows
platform.17 Microsoft sold Excel 3 in 1990 o¤ering backward compatibility to the
15See http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/book/sheets/sheet.html
16See http://www.cs.umd.edu/class/spring2002/cmsc434-0101/MUIseum/applications/lotus123.html
17See http://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/2012/04/102658156-05-01-
20
1-2-3 version 3, free upgrade prices to Lotus customers and a runtime Windows
version shipped free of charge with Excel.18 Consumers switched to Excel and by
1993, Microsoft had outplaced Lotus as the market leader.
Although the model matches well with the real world example identied above,
there are other reasons that may a¤ect an incumbent monopolists decision to
upgrade when he faces a competitive threat. For example, it may be the case
that he is unsure about the quality improvement introduced by the competitor.
It could also be that the success of the new platform (Windows) was ex-ante
questionable. Although these situations are acknolwledged to be possible, they
are not considered in this paper.
1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Market outcome/ Certain Entry/ The incumbent commits to
upgrade and the entrant can price discriminate
If the incumbent commits to upgrade, in period two, perfect compatibility between
the superior products and backward compatibility of the new versions ensure that
the new potential customers join a network of size 1 if they buy from either the
acc.pdf and http://ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/686/Lotus-Development-Corp.html
18See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8s3aAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA40&dq=january+1991
+infoworld+excel+3+vs+lotus+1-2-3+compatibility&hl=en&sa=X&ei=zubjUruJOvGf
7gbqlYDwDQ&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=january%201991%20infowo
rld%20excel%203%20vs%20lotus%201-2-3%20compatibility&f=false and
http://www.joelonsoftware.com/
articles/fog0000000052.html
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incumbent or the entrant. Their net utility if they buy either of the competitors
superior good is q2 +    c   p02; q2 +    c   p2 where p02; p2 are the entrants
and the incumbents price choices, respectively. Old consumers are assumed to
coordinate to a reluctant rule; that is, they buy a product independently of what
the other period one customers do. So, they will purchase the entrants superior
good even if all the other period one customers either stick to the incumbents
initial or upgrade version if:
q2 +   cu   p0u  max fq1 + 1; q2 +   cu   pug ;
where pu; p
0
u are the competitorsprice choices. Since Bertrand competition drives
all prices to zero, the new comers purchase the superior product for free from either
of the competitors. Ifq+2 cu < 0; the old customers stick to the incumbents
initial version. If q + 2   cu  0; the whole market purchases a new product
from either the incumbent or the rival. Working back in the rst period, the
incumbent sets a price for the initial version to attract the incoming customers. If
the rst period potential customers buy the initial version and expect to purchase
the new product in the second period (when q + 2   cu  0), they will do so
by paying a price p1 satisfying the equality:
q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu   p1 = (q2 +   c)
or equivalently, p1 = q1 + 1   c(1  )  cu: Similarly, if old customers expect
not to purcahse a new product (when q+2  cu < 0), they are willing to pay
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a price p1 such that their total expected discounted benet from buying the initial
product and not upgrading is greater than or equal to their expected surplus if
they postpone their decision for period two. Thus, the equilibrium period one
price is set by the incumbent monopolist such that:
q1 + q1 + 1 + 1   c  p1 = (q2 +   c);
or p1 = q1 + q1 + 1   2   c(1  )  q2.
1.5.2 Market outcome/ Certain Entry/ The incumbent commits
not to upgrade and the entrant can price discriminate
Consider now the case that the incumbent commits not to upgrade. The new
customers are assumed to act as if they are a single player. Thus, their net utility
if they buy the entrants superior product is q2 +   c  p02; where p02 is her price
choice. If they all decide to purchase the incumbents initial version, their net
utility is q1 + 2 + 1x1   c   p01; where x1 is the old customersfraction that
sticks to the old product and p
0
1 is his price choice. Thus, the new comers will
decide to purchase the entrants good if:
q2 +   c  p02  q1 + 2 + 1x1   c  p
0
1
Old customers prefer the entrants version even if all the other rst period con-
sumers stick to the old product if:
q2 + a  cu   p0u  q1 + 1 + 2x2;
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where x2 is the new consumers fraction that buys the old good and p
0
u is the
entrants price choice. If q + 2   cu < 0; old customers dont buy the new
product independently of the entrants price choice. Bertrand competition leads
to prices p
0
2 = q, p
0
1 = 0; p
0
u = 0 and the new customers purchase the new
product. If q + 2   cu  0; Bertrand competition leads to equilibrium prices
p
0
2 = q + 1; p
0
1 = 0; p
0
u = q + 2   cu and all the customers buy the
new product. Going back to the initial period, the incumbent sets a price to
attract the rst period potential customers whose outside opportunity is to wait
and make their purchase in the second period by paying a price q. If they
expect that they will buy the superior product in the following period (when
q + 2   cu  0), they are willing to buy the initial version if their expected
total net benet is higher than their discounted payo¤ from postponing their
decision for the following period. Thus, the total expected price they are willing
to pay ( p1 + p
0
u) is given by the equality:
q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu   (q2 +   c q) = p1 + p0u;
or equivalently p1 = q1+q2+1+ c cu (q2+ c q) = q1+q+
1   c(1  )  cu as the optimal incumbents choice is to force the competitor
to set a zero price in the second period to the existing, incumbents old customers:
If old customers expect to stick to the old product (when q + 2   cu < 0);
they are willing to buy the initial product by paying a price p1 that satises the
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equality:
q1 + q1 + 1 + 1   c  p1 = (q2 +   c q)
or p1 = q1 + 1   2   c(1  ):
1.5.3 Market outcome/ Certain Entry/ Incumbents Commitment/
No price discrimination
If the incumbent commits to upgrade, perfect compatibility between the superior
products and backward compatibility of the new version ensure that the new
potential customers join a network of size 1 if they buy from either the incumbent
or the entrant. Their net utility if they buy the entrants or the incumbents
superior good is q2 +    c   p02; q2 +    c   p2 where p02; p2 are the entrants
and the incumbents price choices, respectively. The old consumers will buy the
entrants product even if all the other period one customers either stick to the
incumbents initial or upgrade version if:
q2 +   cu   p02  max fq1 + 1; q2 +   cu   pug ;
where pu is the incumbents price choice for the old consumers who upgrade in
period two. Bertrand competition drives all the prices to zero. Ifq+2 cu < 0;
the old customers stick to the incumbents initial version and the new comers
purchase the superior good for free by either of the competitors. Ifq+2 cu 
0; the whole market purchases for free either the incumbents or the entrants
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high-quality product. In the rst period, the incumbent sets a price for the initial
version to attract the incoming customers. If the old consumers expect to purchase
a new product in the second period (q + 2   cu  0), the price in the rst
period satises the equality:
q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu   p1   pu = (q2 +   c  p02)
or equivalently, p1 = q1 + 1   c(1   )   cu; where pu = p02 = 0: If these
customers expect to keep the initial version (when q + 2   cu < 0), the rst
period price satises the equality:
q1 + q1 + 1 + 1   c  p1 = (q2 +   c);
or p1 = q1 + q1 + 1   2   c(1  )  q2.
Consider now the case that the incumbent commits not to upgrade. The new
customers choose the entrants superior good if:
q2 +   c  p02  max
n
q1 + 2 + 1x1   c  p01; 0
o
where p
0
2; p
0
1 are the entrants and the incumbents second period price choices for
the high and the initial version, respectively. Old consumers prefer the entrants
version and do not stick to the incumbents initial product if:
q2 + a  cu   p02  q1 + 1 + 2x2
or equivalently
q + 2   2x2   cu   p02  0;
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where x2 is the new consumersfraction that buys the old good. If q + 2  
cu  0; q > q + 2   cu; q + 2   cu  2q; Bertrand competition
leads to p
0
2 = q + 2   cu and p01 = 0 and the equilibrium market outcome
is that everyone purchases the entrants new product. Otherwise, the prices are
p
0
2 = q and p
0
1 = 0 with potentially di¤erent equilibrium market outcomes
dependent on the parameter values. To be more precise, if q + 2   cu < 0 or
if q + 2   cu  0; q > q + 2   cu; q + 2   cu < 2q; unlike the
old consumers, the new comers purchase the entrants superior product, whereas
if q + 2   cu  0; q < q + 2   cu; everyone buys the new product in
the second period. In the initial stage, the incumbent sets a price p1 for the lower
quality good such that the potential customers buy it and do not postpone their
purchase decision. First period customersoutside opportunity is to purchase the
superior entrants product by paying a price p
00
2 = q in the future period. If they
expect to buy the higher quality product, (q+2 cu  0; q > q+2 cu;
q + 2   cu  2q); the rst period price satises the equation:
q1+q2+1+ c cu p1 p02 = (q2+ c p
00
2); where p
0
2 = q+2 cu; p
00
2 = q
or equivalently p1 = q1 + 1   c(1   )   2. They also expect to buy q2 if
q + 2   cu  0; q < q + 2   cu. In this case, the rst period price is
given by the equality:
q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu   p1   p02 = (q2 +   c q); where p
0
2 = q
or p1 = q1 + 1   c(1  )  cu: If the old customers expect to stick to the old
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version (if q + 2   cu < 0 or if q + 2   cu  0; q > q + 2   cu;
q + 2   cu < 2q), the rst period price satises the equation:
q1 + q1 + 1 + 1   c  p1 = (q2 +   c q)
and thus, p1 = q1 + 1   c(1  )  2.
1.5.4 Post Entry game/ Potential entry/ The incumbent commits
to upgrade
Think of the hypothetical post-entry scenario when the entrant needs to bear a
xed positive development cost when the incumbent commits to upgrade. Note
that I consider the case where the entrant is able to price discriminate between
the old and the new users. Under the assumption of compatibility between the
rival rmsproducts, the new customersnet utility if they buy the high-quality
product by either the incumbent or the entrant is q2 +  c  p2; q2 +  c  p02,
respectively. Old customers buy the new product even if every other old customer
either chooses the entrants high-quality or the incumbents initial version when:
q2 +   cu   pu  max
n
q2 +   cu   p0u; q1 + 1
o
:
where pu; p
0
u are the the competitorsprice choices and because they expect the
new second period customers to purcahse a new version. If q+2 cu < 0; the
old consumers will not buy the upgraded version independently of the rival rms
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price choices. Bertrand competition leads to prices, p2 = F2   19, p
0
2 =
F
2
:20 New
customers would purchase the superior good from the incumbent and thus, the
potential entrant would incur losses after entry. Thus, she will optimally choose
not to invest. Similarly, think of the post-entry game if q + 2   cu  0.
Bertrand competition would lead to prices p2 = F2   ; p
0
2 =
F
2
; pu =
F
1
  ;
p
0
u =
F
1
and the whole marketwould upgrade. Thus, the potential entrant would
be better-o¤ if she stayed out of the market. Going back to the rst period,
the incumbent needs to attract the potential customers into buying the initial
version of the product. If the rst period customers expect to upgrade (when
q + 2   cu  0); the rst period price is given by the expression:
p1 = q1 + 1   c+ q2 +   cu   pu;
where pu = q + 2   cu: If they expect to stick to the old version (when
q + 2   cu < 0); the rst period price p1 is such that:
p1 = q1 + q1 + 1 + 1   c:
1.5.5 Post entry game/ Potential entry/ The incumbent commits
not to upgrade
I analyze the scenario where the entrant can price discriminate between the dif-
ferent consumersclasses.
19For  being any small positive number
20When, without loss of generality, I assume that the development cost is not prohibitively
high: F < (q2 + 2   cu)minf1; 2g:
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Case 1 q + 2   cu < 0; 2q   F  0:
In the second period, Bertrand competition leads to the entrants and the
incumbents prices being p
0
2 = q; p
0
1 = 0; respectively and only the new potential
customers purchase the superior product. The incumbent in period one sets a
price p1; such that:
q1 + 1 + q1 + 1   c  p1  (q2 +   c  p002);
where the left hand side of the inequality is the customersnet utility from pur-
chasing the lower quality good in period one and retaining it in period two. Note
that if all consumers postpone their purcahse, the price they would face is p
00
2 = q:
Thus, the rst period price satises the above inequality as equality and is given
by the expression:
p1 = q1   (1  )c+ 1   2:
The incumbents and the entrants equilibrium prots are:
I = 1[q1   (1  )c+ 1   2];
E = 2q   F; 2q   F  0;
respectively.
Case 2 q + 2   cu  0; 1(q + 2   cu) + 2(q + 1)  F  0:
In the second period, Bertrand competition leads to the prices p
0
2 = q+1;
p
0
u = q + 2   cu; set by the entrant and p01 = 0 set by the incumbent and
everyone purchases the entrants superior good. Initially, the incumbent sets a
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price p1; such that:
q1 + q2 + 1 +   c  cu   p1   p0u  (q2 +   c  p
00
2);
where p
00
2 = q is the entrants price if the old customers wait and purchase the
superior product in the second period. Thus, the equilibrium prices as well as the
competitorsprots are given by the expressions:
p1 = q1 + 1   c(1  )  cu; p0u = q + 2   cu; p
0
1 = 0; p
0
2 = q + 1.
I = 1[q1 + 1   c(1  )  cu];
E = 1(q + 2   cu) + 2(q + 1)  F:
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CHAPTER 2
COMPATIBILITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INNOVATION AND WELFARE IN DURABLE GOODS
MARKETS WITH NETWORK EFFECTS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter relaxes the assumption of mandatory compatibility set previously
and poses the question: Should dominant rms with durable network goods like
markets for the applications in the software market industry have the obligation
to provide technical compatibility information to direct competitors? This funda-
mental question lies at the intersection of Competition and Intellectual Property
Law and di¤erent countries give di¤erent answers.
In the European Union, market leaders must provide interoperability1 infor-
mation to rivals. Failure to do so is a potential violation of Article 102 (ex article
82) of the European Competition Law, and often leads to regulation forcing a
dominant rm to allow compatibility.2 In a nutshell, the refusal to license Intel-
1We will use the terms interoperability and compatibility interchangeably throughout the
paper.
2See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/handbook_vol_1_en.pdf
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lectual Property may, in itself, constitute a breach of Article 102 if all the following
conditions are met: a) access is indispensable for carrying on a particular business,
b) it results in the elimination of competition on a secondary market and c) it
may lead to consumer harm.3 A famous example comes from the 2008 European
Commission case against Microsoft, which was related to the rms refusal to pro-
vide competitors technical information about its O¢ ce suite so that they could
craft interoperable software.4 The case followed a complaint5 from rms-members
of the ECIS [European Committee of Interoperable Systems] and was put on hold
in December 2009 after Microsofts commitment to comply.6
In contrast, in the United States, a more laissez faire Competition Law with
respect to the Intellectual Property Rights owners is favoured. For example,
Thomas Barnett of the United States Department of Justice argues that: "U.S.
courts recognize the potential benets to consumers when a company, including
a dominant company, makes unilateral business decisions, for example to add
features to its popular products or license its intellectual property to rivals, or to
refuse to do so".7 Indeed, the U.S antitrust authorities conclude that "antitrust
liability for mere unilateral, unconditional refusal to license patents will not play a
meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections".8
3See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN
4See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-19_en.htm
5See http://www.techhive.com/article/124813/article.html
6See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1941_en.htm?locale=en
7See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.htm
8See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681_chapter7.htm
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In this chapter I investigate dominant rmsapproaches towards interoperabil-
ity, how these decisions a¤ect their competitorsincentives to invest in improving
product quality and the welfare e¤ects of refusals to supply interoperability that
may occur in a laissez faire economy. More precisely, my paper provides answers
to the following questions: When do market leaders block interoperability with
a rival future innovator and under what conditions would they support compat-
ibility? If there is incompatibility, does this de-facto mean that it is socially
undesirable? Could a market where compatibility is voluntary converge to inter-
operability when it is socially e¢ cient? Are consumers better-o¤ in an economy
that mandates compatibility?
To answer these questions, a sequential game is built in which a small, in-
novative rival initially decides whether to invest in product quality. The rivals
choice crucially depends on the importance of her idea and the dominant rms
future anticipated support or refusal to supply interoperability information due to
the leaders large installed base of consumers. This model ts a common pattern
in durable, technology goods markets, where a smaller rival may have valuable
ideas that emerge as follow-on, non-drastic substitutable innovations, after the
dominant rms invention hits the market in a Schumpeterian scenario of cre-
ative destruction. My analysis shows that given modest structure on consumer
preferences, the market leader chooses to supply interoperability information if
he anticipates a moderately large quality improvement by the rival. This reects
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that strategic pricing allows him to extract more of the higher future surplus in
the present market when the competitor has the power to price discriminate in-
dependently of new rst period customers(un)willingness to postpone purchase
decisions. An analogous result arises even when the rival cannot price discrim-
inate as long as potential rst period consumers can delay purchase decisions.
When compatibility is not supported and incompatible networks arise, consumer
surplus increases relative to the scenario that compatibility is mandatory due to
more erce competitive forces that reduce equilibrium prices. I also demonstrated
that mandatory compatibility does not de-facto maximise social welfare, while
there is no market failure when network e¤ects are weak. When a rivals product
is more innovative, the dominant rm always refuses to o¤er compatibility. In
turn, when the rival lacks the ability to price discriminate, although the economy
that mandates compatibility or operates under a laissez faire Competition Law
may lead to ine¢ ciency, the presence of incompatibility benets new second pe-
riod consumers, as their surplus is higher when compatibility is not supported due
to the competitive pressures that reduce equilibrium prices. Our conclusions cast
doubts as to whether mandatory interoperability, while trying to support com-
petition, allow technological advancement and protect consumers from abusive
behaviour, may actually distort the market and lead to both socially undesirable
results and customersharm.
This chapter is organized as follows: I next discuss related literature. Section
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2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the case where the anticipated second
period quality improvements are moderately large. I characterize equilibrium
outcomes when compatibility is mandatory and when the economy operates under
a laissez faire Competition Law toward Intellectual Property Rights holders. I then
analyze the problem of a social planner who wishes to maximise social surplus
and I contrast equilibrium outcomes with the social optimum. Section 4 looks
at the case where the superior second period product is expected to be more
innovative. I rst analyze the market equilibrium outcome and determine the
economy that maximises consumerswelfare because the rst welfare measure fails
to answer which economy is socially preferable. Section 5 discusses applications
and concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This work contributes to the literature regarding rms incentives toward com-
patibility with their competitors when network e¤ects are present. In a seminal
paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that rms with a larger installed base prefer
to be incompatible with their rivals. In the same vein, Cremer, Rey and Tirole
(2000) analyze competition between Internet backbone providers and predict that
a dominant rm may want to reduce the degree of compatibility with smaller
market players. Malueg and Schwartz (2006) nd that a rm with the largest in-
stalled base will not support connectivity with rms that are themselves compati-
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ble when its market share exceeds fty percent, or the potential to add consumers
falls. Similar results appear in Chen, Doraszelski and Harrington (2009), who con-
sider a dynamic setting with product compatibility and market dominance. They
nd that if a rm gets a larger market share, it may make its product incom-
patible. If, instead, rms have similar installed bases, they make their products
interoperable to expand the market. Viecens (2009) distinguishes between di-
rect and indirect network e¤ects by studying platform competition between two
rms where users buy a platform and its compatible applications. By allowing for
applications to be substitutes, complements or independent, she considers com-
patibility in two dimensions: 1) compatibility of the complementary good, which
she calls compatibility in applications, 2) inter-network compatibility with direct
network externalities. She nds that the dominant rm never promotes compat-
ibility in applications but both rms nd inter-network compatibility protable.
In contrast to this literature, I focus on durable goods with direct network e¤ects.
Both durability and network externalities are important features of most software
products that are at the heart of this compatibility question. Contrary to the
literature, I consider improvements in product quality and nd that the dominant
rm may support compatibility with its rival when the quality improvement ex-
pected to be introduced by the smaller rm is moderately large. However, the
dominant rm does not o¤er compatibility to a rival that is expected to sell a
su¢ ciently innovative product.
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Economides (2006) argues that it is socially e¢ cient to move toward com-
patibility. Similarly, in Katz and Shapiro (1985), interoperability would raise
consumer surplus. In a static environment, Viecens (2009) concludes that com-
patibility in the applications may be harmful for users and social welfare, particu-
larly when asymmetries are strong. Moreover, inter-network compatibility should
not be supported by consumers. I nd that interoperability could lead to losses in
consumer welfare and dynamic ine¢ ciency because unlike a market that operates
under a laissez faire Competition Law toward Intellectual Property Rights hold-
ers, a regime of compulsory compatibility may result in both higher prices and in
the ine¢ cient introduction of a higher quality product, when the expected quality
improvement is small relative to the network externalities, in which case society
would be better-o¤ without it. For su¢ ciently innovative expected product im-
provements, consumers gain when compatibility is not supported due to the lower
prices that emerge compared to a regime of mandatory compatibility.
A second related strand of literature explores rms incentives to upgrade
durable, network goods and how these decisions a¤ect social welfare. In a monop-
olistic environment, Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) show that upgrades may occur
too frequently due to a rms inability to commit to whether it will upgrade in the
future or not. The present paper indicates that in a market that operates under
a laissez faire Competition Law, the social and private incentives for producing
better products are aligned when network e¤ects are not too strong.
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In the literature on sequential innovation, Scotchmer (1991, 1996), Scotchmer
and Green (1996) and others study the case of single follow-on innovations. They
focus on the breadth and length of patents needed to secure the initial innova-
tors incentives to innovate when a second innovator threatens to innovate as well.
They hold the view that patents for the rst innovator should last longer when a
sequence of innovative activity is undertaken by di¤erent rms than when innova-
tion is concentrated in one rm. I am mainly interested in the interplay between
Intellectual Property Rights protection and rmsbehaviour towards compatibil-
ity. In contrast to these papers, I nd that the rst innovator will voluntarily o¤er
compatibility to rivals because strategic pricing enables him to absorb more of the
expected future prot when he anticipates a moderately large improvement from
the second innovator.
2.2 The Model
My objective is to provide insights into how dominant rmsshort-run compat-
ibility and pricing decisions regarding their durable network goods relate to ho-
mogeneous, forward-looking consumers, and how these anticipated compatibility
choices a¤ect an innovative rivals investment in R&D. The industry I have in mind
is the market for computer software applications highlighted in the introduction.
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2.2.1 Supply
In the three-period model, the sequence of events in the supply side is as follows:
initially, the dominant rm has an installed base 0 of consumers. The market
leader is marketing his product; which improves the level of quality from the
previously sold version of quality q0 to a higher level q1.9 The upgraded version
of quality q1 is backward compatible, allowing its purchasers to interact with the
users of the old version of quality q0: In contrast, forward incompatibility prevents
users of the initial version from saving and editing documents that are created with
the upgrade.10
At the beginning of period t=1, a rival rm can choose to incur a xed cost
F to create a substitute product of higher unknown quality q2 > q1 and only
undertakes R&D when the project has a positive net present value. The fact
that the rival is the only rm that can build on the initial incumbents improved
product of quality q1 may raise the question: why is it not the dominant rm that
is the further innovator?11 After all, he knows his products and he also knows
that his improved good of quality q1 could be improved further. The assumption
is designed to capture the widely observed scenario in the high-tech and software
industry that small rivals often have better ideas than the initially dominant rm.
Thus, the model does not necessarily assume that the dominant rm has no further
9We follow Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) who also assume quality as a positive, real number.
10See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) for a paper with backward compatibility but forward
incompatibility.
11In a related paper, I allow both rms to be future potential innovators.
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ideas; rather, it captures the fact that a smaller competitor may have a better,
future idea. All innovations occur with certainty and the magnitude of the quality
improvements is treated as exogenous.12
At the end of period t=1, the market leader sets the price(s) for his prod-
uct(s) and decides whether to support compatibility by eliciting interoperability
information about his version(s). Note that the quality of the new product q2 is
publically known when the dominant rm is called to make its decisions.13 This
compatibility choice is a binary decision. Following Malueg and Schwartz (2006),
I assume that compatibility requires both partiesconsent, and cannot be achieved
unilaterally using converters or adapters. In addition, in order to avoid potentially
collusive behaviour, licensing of Intellectual Property is free.14
If the dominant rm chooses to be compatible, purchasers of a product of
quality q2 belong to a network of maximum size due to backward compatibility.
In contrast, users of the product of quality q1 cannot interact with the purchasers
of the new version unless they buy the superior product.
If compatibility is not expected to be supported, the rival rm may still in-
novate. More precisely, if the market leader is expected to refuse to o¤er com-
patibility, the rival has an alternative route to innovate that does not use the
dominant rmsnetwork of existing customers. This assumption accords with the
12In a related paper, I consider the case where innovation does not occur with certainty and
current work endogenizes the quality improvements.
13Current work investigates the role of private information in this setting.
14See Malueg and Schwartz (2006).
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Microsoft O¢ ce case highlighted in the introduction: Microsofts refusal to o¤er
compatibility did not, per se, prevent rivals from innovating as they could use the
Open Document Format, which could allow product innovation.
At date t=2, both risk neutral, prot maximising rms simultaneously set
prices. Moreover, products are functional for two periods. Consistent with soft-
ware applications, I assume that the marginal cost of production is zero for all
versions. Note that although I assume that the initial market leader has the power
to price discriminate in period 1, I analyze both cases where in period 2, the rival
has the ability or cannot price discriminate between old and new consumers (see
gure 1 for the timing of the rmsmoves).
Figure 2.1: Timing of the rmsmoves.
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2.2.2 Demand
Consumers are identical and have a per period unitary demand. At date t=0,
there is a mass 0 of customers in the economy who have previously purchased
the product of quality q0, and future generations arrive in constant ows 1; 2 at
dates t=1,2, respectively.
At the end of period 1, new customers (1) observe the dominant rms price
of the product of quality q1 and q0. Their utility is partially dependent on direct
network e¤ects captured by a parameter : Thus, if they purchase the product
of quality q1; their utility (gross of the price that will be determined in the next
section) is q1 + (0 + 1)   c independently of what other customers do, where
0 + 1 is the market size at t=1 and c is these customerscost of learning how
to use the product.15 If they buy the product of quality q0; their utility is q0 +
0x0+1x1 c; where x0; x1 are the old and new customersfractions that own
q0; respectively. I analyze both the case that new customers at t=1 (1) cannot
postpone their purchase, and where they are willing to wait. Old customers (0)
own the product of quality q0 and observe the market leaders upgrade price for
its product q1. If they buy it, their benet is q1 +(0 + 1)  cu; where cu is the
additional adoption cost they need to incur (cu < c). If they stick to the initial
version, their utility is q0 +0x0 +1x1. A date t=1 customers overall benet
15Note that the utility function may not be necessarily linear in income (any monotonic
transformation would su¢ ce).
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depends on his forecast of the prices at t=2, and the way that customers make
purchase decisions. These forecasts reect consumersinformation when they are
called to make purchase decisions and are aligned, in equilibrium.
At date t=2, new consumers (2) observe the prices and decide which product
to buy. If they purchase the dominant rms product of quality q1; their utility
is q1 + 2x2 + (0 + 1)x1   c. If they buy the product of quality q2 and
compatibility is present, their utility is q2 +  c while when compatibility is not
supported, their benet from getting the product of quality q2 is q2 + 2(1  
x2) +(0 +1)(1  x1)  c. These customerspurchasing decision also resembles
a coordination game and following the literature, we assume they behave as a
single player.16 Thus, when compatibility is supported, they buy q2 if q +
(0 + 1)(1   x1) > 0, where q = q2   q1 is the quality improvement from
introducing q2. This expression is always positive and implies that new customers
(gross of prices) are always better-o¤ if they buy the product of quality q2: In
contrast, when there is incompatibility in the market, these customers buy the
product of quality q2 if q + (0 + 1)(1   2x1) > 0: This last expression may
take a negative sign if old customers stick to the product q1 in the second period.
In the similar old consumerscoordination problem, while we assume that second
period old customers coordinate on the Pareto optimum, old rst period customers
coordinate on the global Pareto optimum.17 All consumers make their purchasing
16See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
17See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
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decisions simultaneously and prefer a new product rather than an older version
when they gain the same net expected utility by either of these two choices.
2.3 Moderate expected quality improvements
2.3.1 Market outcome
We start by solving for equilibrium outcomes when compatibility is mandatory
followed by an economy that operates under a laissez faire Competition Law.
Although we solve for equilibria after the product of quality q1 hits the market,
we will not neglect to check the dominant rms initial investment decision at
date t=0. Our benchmark case will consider the scenario that new rst period
customers cannot postpone their purchase and the rival rm has the power to
price discriminate.
2.3.1.1 Mandatory compatibility
Date t=2 New customers in the second period (2) can choose to buy either
the rival rms product of quality q2 or the market leaders previous version q1:18
Given the price charged by the rival, their utility if they buy the version of quality
q2 is q2 +   c  p22; where the rst and second subscripts in the price (p22) are
related to the quality level of the product purchased and the type of customers
18Note that it will become apparent in the rst period analysis that the product of quality
q0 is not sold in the second period and thus, there is not a third choice of purchasing q0 for the
new second period customers.
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buying the good, respectively. If they choose to buy q1; their utility given the
price set by the dominant rm (p12) is q1 + 2x2 + (0 + 1)x1   c  p12 where
x1; x2 are the old and new second period customersfractions that use q1:19 New
customers coordinate, given prices, to what is best for all of them and thus, they
will choose to buy q2 if:
p22   p12  q + (0 + 1)(1  x1); (1)
where q = q2 q1 denotes the quality improvement from purchasing the product
of quality q2 instead of q1:
Lets now turn our attention to the old second period customers (0 + 1): If
they purchase the product of quality q2; their utility given the rivals price p21 is
q2 +    cu   p21 independently of other customerschoices. If they stick to q1;
their utility will be q1 + 2x2 + (0 + 1)x1; where x1; x2 are the 0 + 1; 2
customersfractions that either stick or buy q1 in the second period, respectively.
If old consumers make their purchasing decisions independently of what other old
customers do, they will purchase q2 even if all other 0 + 1 stick to q1 when:
p21  q + 2(1  x2)  cu: (2)
The next assumption holds:
Assumption 1 (A1) q  cu 2
0+1
:
This assumption says that the rival rm is better-o¤ by serving the whole
19It will become apparent in the rst period analysis that the old second period customers
(0 + 1) purchased q1 in the previous period.
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market when she lacks the ability to price discriminate and it allows the linkage
between the two periods. It also implies that at date t=2, old consumers (gross of
prices) benet from purchasing the product of quality q2, allowing us to focus on
the interplay between the extent of network externalities and the second period
quality improvement.
Thus, Bertrand competition leads the second period equilibrium prices to
p22 = q + (0 + 1); p21 = q + 2   cu; p12 = 0:
Date t=1 The next assumption holds regarding the development cost:
Assumption 2 (A2) F < 2 Pr ob(qe  (0 + 1))[qe   (0 + 1)];
where qe = qe2   q1 is the expected quality improvement from the introduction
of the product of quality qe2 in the second period.
This assumption says that the cost of development does not, per se, deter
the rival rm from investing into the new product of expected quality qe2; as the
probability of successfully producing a product of quality at least above a threshold
and the market size are large enough to enjoy positive prots in the second period.
Lets rst think of the maximum price the dominant rm can charge to the
new rst period customers (1) by selling the product of quality q1. If these
customers buy the superior version q1 and they conjecture that they will coordinate
on the Pareto optimum tomorrow, their total net discounted expected utility
given the price set by the dominant rm (p11) if they expect they will purchase
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qe2 in the second period is q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +    c   cu   p11   pe21
independently of what other customers do where pe21 is the price they expect to
pay in order to buy qe2 in the second period and  is the common discount factor
in the economy. Thus, the maximum total expected price they are willing to pay
is p11 + pe21 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +    c   cu if they cannot postpone
their purchase.20 Note that for a su¢ ciently innovative product of quality q1;
the dominant rms maximum price to these consumers by selling the product of
quality q0 is strictly smaller.
Lets now turn our attention to the old consumers (0). By upgrading to
q1 and if they forecast that they will also coordinate to the Pareto optimum
tomorrow, their total expected discounted utility given the price p10 for upgrading
is q1 + qe2 + (0 + 1) +   cu  cu  p10  pe20 independently of what others
do, where pe20 is the price they expect to pay in the second period to buy the
superior product qe2 over the alternative of sticking to q1. If they initially choose
to stick to q0, they may expect to keep it or either upgrade to q1 or purchase qe2
in the second period. Their total discounted expected utility if they expect to
purchase qe2 in the second period is q0 + q
e
2 + a0x
00
0 + 1x
00
1 +    cu   pe020;
where pe020 = q
e + 1(1   x1) + 2(1   x2) is the price they expect to pay in
order to get qe2 in the second period if they conjecture that they will coordinate on
the Pareto optimum tomorrow and x
00
0 ; x
00
1 are the 0; 1 customersfractions who
20See the Appendix for the case these customers are willing to postpone their purchase.
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stick or buy q0 in the rst period, respectively.21 So, they prefer to buy q1 when
they make their purchasing decisions independently of what other old customers
do if:
p10 + p
e
20  q + qe + 1(1  x
00
1) + 2(1  x2) + 1(1  x1)  cu
where from the rst period perspective, q = q1   q0; qe = qe2   q1 are the
rst and second period quality improvements, respectively. The price p10 is a
decreasing function of the number of the new customers who buy the product of
quality q0 in the rst period (x
00
1): Thus, the optimal dominant rms choice is to
stop selling the product of quality q0 in the rst period and the pricing decisions
satisfy the expressions:
p11 + p
e
21 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu; (3)
p10 + p
e
20 = q + q
e + 1 + 2 + 1   cu: (4)
We observe that the total maximum expected payment that new and old customers
are willing to pay is xed. The dominant rms optimal choice is to set:
p11 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu   pe21 (3)
p10 = q + q
e + 1 + 2 + 1   cu   pe20; (4)
where pe21 = p
e
20 = q
e + 2   cu.
21Check the Appendix for the price these customers expect to pay to buy qe2:
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The next proposition summarizes the market equilibrium outcome in an econ-
omy where compatibility is mandatory and it holds independently of the rivals
ability to price discriminate and new rst period customerswillingness to wait:
Proposition 8 Under assumptions A1, A2, the dominant rm stops selling the
old version of quality q0 in the rst period. Instead, he sells the product q1 to the
new and the old rst period customers. In the second period, the product of quality
q2 is sold by the rival to the market.
2.3.1.2 Laissez faire Competition Law
We will solve for equilibrium outcomes when the economy operates under a laissez
faire Competition Law after discussing the rmsand customersoptimal choices
when there is incompatibility in the market.
Date t=2 If there is a product of quality q2 in the market and all new second
period customers (2) buy it, their utility given the price charged by the rival rm
(p22) is q2 + 2 + (0 + 1)(1  x1)  c  p22 and if they all buy q1; their utility
given the dominant rms price p12 is q1 + 2 + (1 + 0)x1   p12; where x1
is the old customersfraction that sticks to q1 in the second period.22 Thus, 2
customers buy q2 if:
22Note that the facts that the product of quality q0 is not sold in the second period and thus,
there is not a third choice of purchasing q0 for the new second period customers as well as that
old second period customers (0+1) have purchased q1 in the rst period will become apparent
in the rst period analysis.
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p22   p12  q + (0 + 1)(1  2x1): (5)
Lets turn our attention to the old second period customers (0 + 1). Their
utility if they purchase q2 is q2+(0+1)(1 x1)+2(1 x2) cu p21 given the
rivals price p21 while if they stick to q1; their utility is q1 +2x2 +(1 + 0)x1;
where x1; x2 are the old and new customers fractions that stick or buy q1 in
the second period: If old customers make their purchase decision independently
of what other old customers do, they will choose to buy q2 even if all other old
customers stick or buy q1 (x1 = 1) when:
p21  q + 2(1  2x2)  (0 + 1)  cu: (6)
We make the following assumption with respect to the quality improvement from
the introduction of the product of quality q2:
Assumption 3 (A3) (a) q+2(1 2x2) (0+1) cu < 0; 0  x2  1;
(b) q2   q1  q1   q0.
The rst part of the assumption (a) says that when compatibility is not sup-
ported, rst period customers expect not to buy the rivals product of anticipated
quality qe2 and thus, we restrict attention to moderately high values of quality
improvements relative to network e¤ects. The second part of the assumption (b)
says that a given investment leads to a smaller quality improvement in the second
rather than in the rst period when the product of quality q1 is an important
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innovation. In the next section, we will relax assumption 3 when we consider a
su¢ ciently innovative future product compared to the extent of network e¤ects.
Case 1: q < (0 + 1):
In this scenario, the product quality q2 does not allow the rival to generate
any revenue in the second period. Instead, new second period customers purchase
the product of quality q1; as price competition leads to
p12 = q1   q2 + (0 + 1)  "; (7)
for a small positive number ":
Date t=1 If new customers (1) buy the good of quality q1, their total expected
discounted utility given the price charged by the dominant rm p11 and their
forecast of coordinating on the Pareto optimum tomorrow is q1 + q1 + (0 +
1) +   c  p11.23
Lets now turn our attention to the old consumers in the rst period (0): If
they buy the product of quality q1; their total expected discounted utility given
the upgrade price charged by the dominant rm (p10) is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +
  cu  p10; independently of what other customers do: If they stick to q0; their
expected utility by upgrading in the second period to q1 is q0 + q1 + 0x0 +
1x1+ cu pe10; where pe10 = q+1(1 x01) 0+2(1 x02)  cu  
23Similarly with the case when compatibility is present, the dominant rms optimal price to
these customers by selling q0 is strictly smaller for a su¢ ciently innovative product of quality
q1:
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is the price they expect to pay tomorrow in order to upgrade if they forecast they
will coordinate on the Pareto optimum tomorrow.24 If old customers make their
purchasing decisions independently of what other old customers do, they upgrade
to q1 in the rst period even if all other old 0 consumers stick to q0 if:
p10  q + 1(1  x1)  cu + cu + pe10:
Notice that since the dominant rms prots are a decreasing function of the
number of 1 customers that buy q0 in the rst period (x1); its optimal choice is
to stop selling the initial version in the rst period (and x1 = 0 in the inequality
above). Thus, the rst period prices are given by the expressions:
p11 = q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +   c; (8)
p10 = q + 1   cu + cu + pe10; (9)
where
pe10 = q + 1 + 2   0   cu   ": (10)
Case 2: q > (0 + 1):
In this scenario, the prices at date t=2 are given by the expressions:
p22 = q   (0 + 1); p12 = 0: (11)
Date t=1 Lets rst think of the new customers in the rst period (1). If they
buy the product of quality q1; their total expected discounted utility given the
24See the Appendix for the determination of this price.
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dominant rms price p11 is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + 1 + 0   c  p11 if they
conjecture that they will coordinate on the Pareto optimum tomorrow.25
Lets now turn our attention to the old customers in the rst period (0):
If they upgrade to q1; given the dominant rms upgrade price p10; their total
expected discounted utility is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + 0 + 1   cu   p10
if they forecast that they will coordinate on the Pareto optimum tomorrow. If
they keep q0, their total discounted expected utility if they expect to purchase
qe2 is q0 + q
e
2 + 0x
000
0 + 1x
000
1 + 2x2 + 1x1 + 0x0   cu   p0e20 where
p
0e
20 = q
e   0 + 1(2x1   1) + 2(2x2   1) is the price they expect to pay in
order to purchase qe2 tomorrow if they conjecture they will also coordinate to the
Pareto optimum in the following period and x
000
0 ; x
000
1 are the old and the new rst
period customersfractions that stick or buy q0 today, respectively while x0; x1; x2
are the old and new second period customers that are expected to purchase q2
tomorrow.26 Old rst period consumers buy q1 in the rst period even if all other
customers of the same class choose q0 (x
000
0 = 1) if:
p10  q + 1(1  x0001 )  cu(1  )  0 + 1x1   2(1  x2):
Since p10 is a decreasing function of the number of 1 customers who buy q0 in
the rst period (x
000
1 ), the dominant rms optimal choice is to stop selling q0 in
the rst period (thus, x
000
1 = 0 in the inequality above) and the rst period price
25For a su¢ ciently innovative product of quality q1; the maximum price the dominant rm
could charge these customers for q0 is strictly smaller.
26See the Appendix for the calculation of this expected price.
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is:
p10 = q + 1   cu + cu   0: (12)
Note that this price is strictly smaller than the optimal price that the dominant
rm would set when there is compatibility in the market. The optimal dominant
rms price to 1 customers if they cannot postpone their purchase is:
p11 = q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)  c:27 (13)
Depending on the quality improvement expected to be introduced by the
competitor (qe) and for di¤erent values of the investment (F ), we identify the
following (ex-post) scenarios:
S1 qe  (0 +1)cu < F < (0 +1)(qe +2  cu): This scenario implies
that the expected quality improvement in the second period is relatively small
relative to network externalities (qe < (0 + 1)).
S2 F  qe  (0 + 1)cu; qe  (0 + 1): This scenario occurs when the
quality di¤erential anticipated to be introduced by the competitor is relatively
large compared to the extent of network e¤ects.
S3 F  qe (0+1)cu; qe < (0+1): This scenario necessarily implies
that the network parameter is greater than the upgrading cost (  cu).
In a laissez faire economy, the dominant rm compares its expected prot
under the two regimes and decides whether to support compatibility or not. The
27See the Appendix for the price these customers are willing to pay if they can postpone their
purchasing decision.
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next proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the economy that oper-
ates under a laissez faire Competition Law. When old customers coordinate on
the Pareto optimum,28 the proposition holds when the rival can price discrimi-
nate independently of whether new rst period customers cannot postpone their
purchasing decision or are willing to wait and also holds when the rival lacks
the ability to price discriminate and rst period customers can postpone their
purchase:29
Proposition 9 (a) If A1-A3 and S1 or S3 hold, the dominant rm does not
support compatibility and all customers purchase the product of quality q1 in both
periods:(b) If A1-A3 and S2 hold, the dominant rm supports compatibility and
consumers in the second period buy the rivals product of quality q2.
The dominant rms optimal choice is to refuse to o¤er compatibility for a
relatively small quality improvement (a). On the other hand, if the quality dif-
ferential by the competitor is large relative to the network externalities (b), the
dominant rms optimal strategy is to o¤er interoperability to its competitor be-
cause it can absorb in the rst period more of the expected discounted future total
surplus which is higher when compatibility is present.
28If these customers coordinate on what all the other members of their class prefer, the
dominant rm would be indi¤erent between supporting or impeding compatibility.
29See the Appendix for the dominant rms compatibility and price choices when consumers
can postpone their purchase and the rival cannot price discriminate.
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2.3.2 Social Optimum
It is important to analyze the social e¢ ciency of the results obtained previously
and this subsection considers the problem faced by a planner that maximizes
social surplus after the important version of quality q1 is produced. He chooses
whether using the product of quality q1 for two periods or introducing the new
product q2 is socially optimal. Although consumerswelfare is also of rst order
of importance, social surplus is a fuel for economic growth and will be our initial
welfare measure.
If the product of quality q1 is used in both periods, social welfare is:
WN = 0[q1+q1+(0+1)+ cu]+1[q1+q1+(0+1)+ c]+2(q1+ c):
If the superior product of quality qe2 is sold to everyone
30, social welfare becomes:
WU = 0[q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   cu   cu] + 1[q1 + qe2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu] +
+2(q
e
2 +   c)  F;
where in the second period, all customers join a network of maximum size. Com-
paring the expressions above yields the socially optimal outcome:
Proposition 10 It is socially e¢ cient if (a) the product of quality q1 is sold for
two periods when A1 and S1 hold; (b) the product of quality qe2 is introduced and
purchased by the whole market if A1 and S2 hold.
30Because of assumption 1, the third potential case of having incompatible products is not
optimal.
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It is socially e¢ cient if the good of quality q1 is sold for both periods when the
benet from everyone purchasing it is smaller than the total investment and the
cost of learning how to use the new product (qe < F + cu(0 + 1)): When the
last inequality is reversed, social optimality is achieved when the superior product
is introduced in the second period and is purchased by both the new and the old
consumers.
Depending on the industry characteristics and the expected quality improve-
ment, the market outcome may lead to socially undesirable results. More precisely,
the next proposition highlights the potential ine¢ ciency that may arise in markets
that operate under a laissez faire Competition Law towards Intellectual Property
Rights or under mandatory compatibility:
Proposition 11 (a) If S1 holds, an economy that mandates interoperability leads
to the ine¢ cient introduction of the product of quality q2:(b) There is no inef-
ciency in the laissez faire market if the network parameter is smaller than the
cost of upgrading ( < cu). (c) If network e¤ects are strong (  cu), the mar-
ket that operates under a laissez faire Competition Law may lead to an ine¢ cient
technological slowdown when S3 holds.
Independently of the extent of network externalities relative to the adoption
cost, an economy that mandates compatibility may lead to the ine¢ cient intro-
duction of the product of quality q2 (S1). A laissez faire market leads to social
e¢ ciency when network e¤ects are relatively weak ( < cu) and consumer wel-
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fare is always maximised when compatibility is not supported due to lower prices
set to new second period customers. These results are important contributing in
the discussion among academics and policy makers regarding the desirability of a
more interventionist Competition Law, as they indicate that mandated compati-
bility by Competition Authorities decreases consumer welfare and may also lead
to ine¢ ciency. On the other hand, a laissez faire market may lead to ine¢ ciency
for relatively strong network e¤ects ( > cu) and for small values of the cost of de-
velopment (c). In particular, it may be socially e¢ cient to introduce the product
of quality qe2 in the second period and nevertheless, a laissez faire market leads to
technological slowdown withholding the product of quality qe2 from the economy.
2.4 Su¢ ciently innovative quality improvements
In this section, we relax the assumption that old second period customers only buy
the rivals product when compatibility is present and after we solve for equilibrium
outcomes in an economy that operates under a laissez faire Competition Law, we
will investigate whether an economy that mandates compatibility or the one that
allows rms to choose is preferable. Our benchmark case considers that the rival
cannot price discriminate between the di¤erent customersclasses and the new
rst period customers are not willing to postpone their purchase.
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2.4.1 Market outcome
When compatibility is mandatory, the rival rms possible choices are either to
serve the whole market or only the new second period consumers. For quality
improvement sastisfying (A1), her optimal choice is to serve the whole market by
setting an equilibrium price p21 = q + 2   cu: In the rst period, the market
leader extracts customersexpected total surplus by setting a price to the new
and the old rst period comers (from (3) and (4)):
p11 + p
e
21 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu;
p10 + p
e
20 = q + q
e + 1 + 2 + 1   cu;
respectively, where pe21 = p
e
20 = q
e+2 cu is the rivals expected second period
price.
When compatibility is not supported, in the second period, there are again two
candidate prices for the rival: she can either charge p21 = q+2 (0+1) cu
and serve the whole market or p22 = q   (0 + 1) and only serve the new
comers: When network e¤ects are strong (2 > cu), her optimal choice is to
choose p21 while for relatively weaker network externalities, she will decide to o¤er
the new product to everyone when the quality improvement from its introduction
is su¢ ciently large, satisfying the following inequality:
q   (0 + 1) + 1
0 + 1
(2   cu) > 0:
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In this case, the rst period prices to the new and the old rst period consumers
are calculated using the equations:
p11 + p
e
21 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu;
p10 + p
e
21 = q + q
e + 1 + 2 + 1   cu   a0;
where pe21 = q
e + 2   (0 + 1)  cu.
In a laissez faire Competition Law, the dominant rm compares its expected
prot by supplying or not allowing interoperability to the rival. The next propo-
sition summarizes the equilibrium outcome independently of the rivals ability to
price discriminate and new customers(un)wilingness to delay their purchasing
decision:
Proposition 12 In equilibrium, the dominant rm never supports compatibility
with the smaller rm in the second period. Consumers purchase her product of
quality q2 in the second period.
2.4.2 ConsumersWelfare maximization
We will focus on consumerswelfare because the economies that operate under
mandatory compatibility or a laissez faire Competition Law are equivalent with
respect to the rst welfare measure and may also lead to ine¢ ciency. Thus, in
this case our welfare measure will be consumerssurplus and the next proposition
summarizes the comparison between the economy that mandates compatibility
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and the one that operates under a laissez faire Competition Law when the rival
cannot price discriminate:31
Proposition 13 Consumers Welfare is maximised under a laissez faire Compe-
tition Law. In particular, if S1 holds and A3 is relaxed, both a laissez faire market
and an economy that mandates compatibility lead to the ine¢ cient introduction of
the product of quality q2 while consumers are better-o¤ in a laissez faire economy.
For su¢ ciently innovative second period products (A3 does not hold), the
dominant rm does not support compatibility with his rival. This fact leads to a
higher degree of competition in the second period and to lower prices, beneting
the new second period consumers.
2.5 Applications/ Discussion/ Future Research
This chapter analyses rmsbehaviour towards compatibility and the relation of
these decisions with their incentives to invest in improving their durable network
goods. By using a sequential game, we give a smaller rival the ability to build
on innovations previously introduced by the market leader. Recognizing the in-
tertemporal linkage in forward-looking customerspurchasing choices, we nd that
in anticipation of a moderately large quality improvement by the rival, strategic
pricing leads the dominant rm to support compatibility even if it could exclude
31If she can price discriminate, consumers surplus is equivalent under compatibility and a
laissez faire economy.
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its rival from using its network. On the other hand, the market leader does not
support compatibility when the new products are su¢ ciently innovative.
Regarding welfare, an economy that mandates compatibility may lead to the
ine¢ cient introduction of a relatively less innovative product. We also nd that
when network e¤ects are weak, a laissez faire market converges to social e¢ ciency
while when network e¤ects are strong, the refusal to supply interoperability in-
formation may lead to the ine¢ cient slowdown of technological progress. For
su¢ cienlty large expected quality improvements, a laissez faire Competition Law
leads to incompatibility and erce competitive forces benet consumers through
lower prices.
An important application captured by the model comes from the 2008 Eu-
ropean Commission case against Microsoft regarding its o¢ ce suite highlighted
earlier in the introduction. Although Microsofts compliance to compatibility was
enforced by the European Commission, this mandate in favour of interoperabil-
ity may have been harmful for society. In particular, Microsoft O¢ ce 2007 was
followed by Corels WordPerfect O¢ ce suite in 2008 that introduced negligible
quality improvements. In anticipation of this, Microsft decided not to support
compatibility in the rst place. This denial to support compatibility would have
a twofold e¤ect: First, it would lead to an increase in consumer welfare due to a
higher degree of competition between incompatible networks. Second, as proposi-
tion 4 shows, a market operating under a laissez faire competition policy towards
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intellectual property rights would lead to social e¢ ciency, assuming that net-
work e¤ects are weak relative to the cost of learning the new product. Moreover,
mandating compatibility would lead to ine¢ ciency, as society would have been
better-o¤ without the new product (4a).
The policy implication of these ndings is that competition Authorities should
investigate whether mandating compatibility may sometimes be socially unwel-
come without necessarily beneting consumers or even harming them. Instead,
markets that allow unilateral refusals to supply interoperability information may
possibly lead to e¢ cient outcomes and even improve consumerswelfare. In an
economy where network e¤ects are present, this exercise is not trivial but if net-
work e¤ects are not too strong and quality improvements are moderate, an econ-
omy operating under a laissez faire Competition Law generates social e¢ ciency
and maximises consumer welfare. For su¢ ciently innovative new products, a
laissez faire economy leads to incompatibility and maximises consumer surplus
through lower prices when the rival lacks the ability to price discriminate between
the di¤erent consumersclasses.
Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that are important and are not
addressed in this paper. Firstly, a model that will test empirically our results could
validate our predictions. It would also be interesting to study the competitors
interoperability/investment decisions in the presence of stochastic demand.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 New rst period customers (1) can postpone their purchase/
The rival can price discriminate
2.6.1.1 Compatibility
Given the rst period price, p11; new rst period customerstotal expected utility
if they buy q1 is q1+qe2+(0+1)+ c cu p11 pe21: If they all postpone
their purchase, they would belong to a network of size 1+2 (new second period
customers) and the rivals expected second period price can be computed by the
equality:
qe2 +   c  pe22 = q1 + (1 + 2)  c  pe12;
or equivalently pe22 = q
e + 0. Thus, their outside opportunity if they wait in
the rst period is (qe2 + a  c  pe22) = [q1 + (1 + 2)  c] and the maximum
expected total price they are willing to pay to buy the product of quality q1 or
equivalently the dominant rms maximum rst period price is: p11 + pe21 =
q1 + q
e + (0 + 1) + 0   c(1  )  cu.
2.6.1.2 Incompatibility
We focus on the case that qe  (0 + 1):
New rst period customerstotal expected utility if they purchase q1 is q1 +
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q1+(0+1) + (0+1)  c p11. If they postpone their purchase, they will
subsequently belong to a network of size 1 + 2 and their expected discounted
utility is (qe2+(1+2) c pe0022), where p00e22 is the expected second period price
that can be computed in the following equation:
qe2 + (2 + 1)  c  pe
00
22 = q1 +   c  p12;
or equivalently pe22 = q
e   0: Their net expected utility if they wait to make
their purchasing decision tomorrow is (q1+a c): Thus, the maximum price these
customers are willing to pay today to buy q1 is p11 = q1+ (0+1) 2 c(1 ):
If qe < (0 +1); the dominant rms optimal choice is to impede compat-
ibility. In particular, the dominant rm compares his expected prot and he does
not support compatibility if the following inequality is satised:
12 + 2(q1 +   c) + 0(q + 2   cu) > 0;
which is always true since q > qe:
2.6.2 Old rst period customersexpected second period prices af-
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ter sticking to q0 in the rst period.
2.6.2.1 Compatibility
Old customers expect to buy qe2 when all customers of their class either buy q1 or
stick to q0 if:
qe2 + a  cu   pe
0
20 
 maxfq0 + 0 + 1x001 + 2x
00
2 ; q1 + 0 + 1x1 + 2x2   cu   pe
0
10g;
or equivalently: pe
0
20 = q
e + 1(1  x1) + 2(1  x2); pe10 = 0:
2.6.2.2 Incompatibility/ qe < (0 + 1)
If 0 customers stick to q0 in the rst period, there are some possibilities in the
following period: if they keep q0; their second period utility is q0+0x
0
0+1x
0
1+
2x
0
2 while if they buy q1; their second period utility will be q1 +    cu   p10:
Thus, they will buy the higher quality product in the second period when they
make their purchasing decisions independently of what other 0 customers do if:
p10  q + 1(1  x01) + 2(1  x
0
2)  cu:
Thus, the price expected to be set by the dominant rm in the second period is
pe10 = q + 1(1  x01) + 2(1  x02)  cu:
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2.6.2.3 Incompatibility/ qe  (0 + 1)
0 customers expect to pay a price p
e0
20 to purchase q2 in the future period even if
all other customers of their class either buy q1 or stick to q0 for both periods if we
solve the following equation:
q2 + 2x2 + 1x1   cu   pe020 =
maxfq1 +0 +2(1  x2) +1(1  x1)  cu  pe010; q0 +0 +1x01 +2x
0
2g;
or equivalently:
pe
0
20 = q
e + 2(2x2   1) + 1(2x1   1)  0
while their utility if they stick to q0 for both periods is strictly dominated by
purchasing q1 tomorrow (q1 is a su¢ ciently innovative product).
2.6.3 Market oucome/ The rival cannot price discriminate/ Con-
sumers can postpone their purchase
2.6.3.1 Compatibility
Think of new consumers in the rst period (1): their total expected utility if they
purchase the product of quality q1 is q1+qe2+(0+1)+ c cu p11 pe21
where pe21 = q
e +2  cu (for moderately large expected quality improvements,
she is better-o¤ by choosing to serve all the customers instead of only the new
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second period potential consumers). If they all postpone their purchasing decision,
their total discounted expected utility is (qe2+ c pe021), where pe021 is the expected
rivals second period price. This price can be computed using the equation:
qe2 +   c  pe
0
21 = q1 + (1 + 2)  c  pe
0
11;
or equivalently pe
0
21 = q
e + 0: Thus, the maximum rst period price p11 that
these customers are willing to pay to purchase the product of quality q1 is such
that:
q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu   p11   pe21 = (qe2 +   c  pe
0
21)
or equivalently p11 = q1 +(0 + 1) + 0  2  c(1  ). Regarding the old
rst period customers (0), they will buy q1 if:
q1+ q
e
2+(0+1)+   cu  cu p10  pe21  q0+0+ + qe2  cu  pe
0
21;
where pe21 = q
e + 2   cu and pe021 is computed using the equation:
qe2 +   cu   pe21 = q1 + 0   cu   pe11
or equivalently pe21 = q
e + (1 + 2). Thus, the maximum rst period price
that induces old customers to buy q1 is p10 = q + 1 + 1   cu + cu:
2.6.3.2 Incompatibility/ A3 holds
We start with the scenario that qe  (0 + 1):
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New customerstotal expected utility if they purchase the product of quality
q1 is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)   c   p11 while if they all wait, their
outside opportunity is [qe2 + (1 + 2)  c  p0e21]; where p0e21 is the competitors
expected second period price choice and is computed if we use the equation:
qe2 + (1 + 2)  c  p
0
21 = q1 +   c  p11
or equivalently: pe
0
21 =q
e   0: Thus, the dominant rms optimal rst period
choice is p11 = q1 + (0 + 1)  2   c(1  ):
Old customers will purchase q1 and will not stick to q0 if:
q1+ q1+(0+1) + (0+1)  cu  p10  q0+ qe2 +0+ 2  cu  pe
00
20;
where the expected price pe
00
20 is computed if we use the equation
qe2 + 2   cu   pe
00
20 = q1 + (0 + 1)  cu   p10;
or equivalently pe
00
20 = q
e + 2   (0 + 1): Thus, the dominant rms rst
period equilibrium price choice, p10 = q + 1   cu(1  ):
If qe < (0+1); the dominant rm impedes compatibility as the following
inequality holds:
1[q1 + (1 + 2)  c] + 0[c  cu + (q + 2   cu)] + 2(q1 +   c) > 0
which always holds when q  qe:
Proposition 9 summarizes the dominant rms optimal strategy and the mar-
ket equilibrium outcome.
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Note that if A3 does not hold, the dominant rm is indi¤erent between sup-
porting and impeding compatibility.
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CHAPTER 3
INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE, COMPATIBILITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN DURABLE GOODS MARKETS
WITH NETWORK EFFECTS
3.1 Introduction
The discussion in the previous chapter is now expanded to include situations where
both an initially dominant and a smaller rival may innovate and innovations no
longer occur with certainty but they follow a discrete time stochastic process.
More precisely, we aim to provide some answers to the following questions: Why
do dominant rms decide to supply interoperability information of their durable
network products? Even if they refuse to support compatibility, does this nec-
essarily imply that their R&D incentives are curbed?1 Could smaller rivals be
better-o¤ if they did not support compatibility with the current market leader?
Which economy o¤ers the socially preferable balance of aggregate R&D incen-
tives: one that operates under mandatory compatibility or under a laissez faire
1We will use the terms interoperability and compatibility interchangeably throughout the
paper.
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competition law? These questions are certainly not new but this is the rst paper
to examine them in an environment where technological progress is modelled in a
scenario with sequential innovations of durable network products.
Although standard economic theory predicts that dominant rms may refuse
to reveal interoperability information to smaller rivals2, there are many cases in
technology markets where rms with leading market shares welcome compatibility
even from direct competitors.3 In the absence of network e¤ects, a potential
explanation of dominant rmssupport to competition and imitation is sequential,
important innovation: the initial inventor allows imitation instead of getting a
patent as the (exogenous) probability of future inventions increases, allowing him
to enjoy a higher expected payo¤ which outweighs the loss from a lower current
prot.4
In this chapter, we provide an explanation of dominant rmssupport to com-
patibility: we endogenize rmsprobability of successful innovation by studying
the competitorsR&D incentives as well as their compatibility choices in the pres-
ence of durable, network goods and we show that sequential important innovation
may lead the dominant rm to voluntarily support compatibility even if it may
compete directly with its rival in the future. In this case, dominant rms invest
less if the intellectual property rights system is very strong. In particular, we
2See Chen, Doraszelski and Harrington (2009).
3See Viecens (2009) and Bessen and Maskin (2009) for examples concerning dominant rms
welcoming compatibility and competition.
4See Bessen and Maskin (2009).
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consider a model where substitutable, sequential innovations result from a dis-
crete time R&D stochastic process and technological progress is modelled with
exogenous quality improvements.5 We give both an initially dominant and a rival
rm the ability to come up with valuable ideas following a commonly observed
scenario of creative destruction in the Hi-tech and software industry where smaller
innovative rivals often displace initial market leaders.6 We nd that for impor-
tant innovative products, the leader invests more when compatibility is present
and in fact, he voluntarily chooses to o¤er interoperability information to the ri-
val, who in turn accepts it only when the current market size is relatively large.
For less innovative products, we nd that when network e¤ects are larger than a
cuto¤, a laissez faire competition law with respect to intellectual property hold-
ers leads the dominant rm to reject compatibility and also invest less than in
an economy where compatibility is mandatory. Our welfare analysis, based on a
more "economically sound" comparison of the market outcome with the socially
optimal level of investment, shows that a laissez faire competition law is socially
preferable compared to an economy operating under mandatory compatibility, es-
pecially when network e¤ects are relatively weak. These results cast doubts as to
whether mandated compatibility by Competition Authorities may lead to socially
undesirable results.
This chapter is organized as follows: the next subsection discusses the related
5Further work will endogenize the quality improvements.
6For example, Microsoft Excel replaced Lotus 1-2-3 and Microsoft Word replaced WordPer-
fect.
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literature. Section 2 presents the Model. In Section 3, we solve for equilibrium
outcomes when compatibility is either mandatory and under a laissez faire com-
petition law. Section 4 provides the socially e¢ cient investment level that a social
planner would induce and a comparison with the market equilibrium investment
under the economies that operate under mandatory compatibility or under a lais-
sez faire competition law. Section 5 concludes.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter relates rst to the literature regarding rmsattitude towards com-
patibility. In an economy where network e¤ects exist and product quality is con-
stant, although compatibility increases the number of potential buyers because
of a larger network, the market leader prefers not to support it because other-
wise, he would lose the advantage of the larger installed base.7 When sequential
innovation occurs with certainty and products are substitutable, Athanasopoulos
(2014) showed that a dominant market player o¤ers interoperability information
of his durable products to a smaller innovative rival when he expects a moderately
large, future quality improvement from his competitor. Thus, strategic pricing al-
lows the market leader to extract more of the higher expected total surplus when
he supports compatibility. An imprortant assumption in this model is that the
rival is the only rm that can innovate in the future. Our work di¤ers because
7See the previous chapter for papers in this literature.
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innovation no longer happens with certainty and both competitors are potential
future inventors. For su¢ ciently innovative future products, we also nd that the
dominant rm voluntarily supports compatibility.
When network e¤ects are not present and innovations are sequential and com-
plementary, Bessen and Maskin (2009) showed that the initial innovator may
welcome imitation because it allows both competitors to invest, increasing the
exogenous probability of successful innovation and thus his second period prot,
outweighing the loss from the foregone rst period revenues. We depart from
their work in a number of ways: rst, we assume that direct network e¤ects as
well as product durability are present. Second, we assume that there is an alter-
native process that allows for product innovation even if there is incompatibility
in the market. Third, unlike their paper where the probability of successful inno-
vation is a parameter, we adopt a game theoretical approach where rmsR&D
cost is a function of the probability of success. We also consider forward look-
ing customers and their role in determining the market equilibrium outcome and
the social optimum. We agree with the message of their paper: dominant rms
welcome compatibility when future products are su¢ ciently innovative while in-
terestingly, we also nd that the smaller rival may reject compatibility if the initial
market size is relatively small. We also show that the initial market leader rejects
interoperability for less important expected new products.
In addition, this work relates to a threatened incumbents and a smaller rivals
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R&D incentives when the economy operates under mandatory compatibility or a
laissez faire Competition Law with respect to Intellectual Property Rights holders
when network e¤ects are present and substitutable products are durable. The
Literature has focused mostly on the initial market structure and assesses whether
a monopolist with perfectly exclusive Property Rights has higher or lower R&D
incentives than his counterpart under perfect or imperfect competition.8 In this
work, we assume an initial monopolist who is threatened to be displaced by a
smaller innovative rival. We nd that when network e¤ects are relatively weak
and for less innovative products, the dominant rm invests more when he does not
supply interoperability, not allowing the rival to use his network. When the new
versions are relatively important, the market leader initially invests more when
compatibility is supported.9
Regarding welfare, Bessen and Maskin (2009) showed that for important com-
plementary innovations, imitation raises welfare and patents may impede inno-
vation. When network e¤ects are present, Economides (2006) also found that
compatibility raises social and consumerswelfare. We nd that a laissez faire
Competition Law either leads to compatibility or o¤ers a socially preferable bal-
ance of both competitorsR&D incentives compared to the economy that operates
under mandatory compatibility.
8See Gilbert (2006) for an excellent survey on issues related to the initial market structure
and the rmsincentives.
9Current work looks at the initial market structure and the competitors incentives when
network e¤ects are present and products are durable.
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3.2 The Model
Consider the market for computer software applications where the current market
leader must choose how much to invest into improving its durable, network prod-
uct. The rm also needs to decide whether to support compatibility of its current
and future version with a smaller rival that can also potentially innovate and
has the same set of possible strategies regarding the compatibility of her future
product and investment decisions.
On the supply side, the sequence of events is as follows: at date t=0, competi-
tors simultaneously decide their investment levels as well as their attitude towards
compatibility. Compatibility is a binary decision, is achieved bilaterally and comes
free of charge.10 The two research lines are independent and no rm has a cost
advantage in its R&D process over its opponent. More precisely, we assume that
R&D spending is quadratic in the probability of successfully improving product
quality.
At date t = 1, the dominant rm chooses the price for its initial version of
quality q111 while in the second (t = 2), the two rms compete a la Bertrand.
If both research lines are successful, rms sell an improved product of expected
quality qe2 (q
e
2 > q1), which is considered as exogenous in the model.
12 Forward
10See Malueg and Schwartz (2006).
11We follow Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) who also considered quality as a positive, real
number q.
12Current work endogenizes the quality improvement.
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incompatibility of the product of quality q1 prevents its users from working with
a le that is created with a product of higher quality q2. If compatibility is
supported and because of backward compatibility, buyers of a product of quality
q2 join a network of maximum size.13 In contrast, when there is incompatibility,
purchasers of a product of quality q2 join only their sellers network. Note that
the goal of both rms is to maximise their expected prots where the marginal
cost of production for all product versions is normalized to zero.14
On the demand side, consumers are identical and arrive in constant ows t
(t = 1; 2). At date t=1, 1 may observe the price for the product of quality q1 and
must decide whether to buy it. Their utility is partially dependent on network
e¤ects, captured by the parameter : Thus, if they buy a product of quality
q1; their utility (gross of price) is q1 + 1x1   c; where x1 is the 1 customers
fraction that also buys q1 and c is these customersadoption cost.15 Of course,
these customersoverall benet depends on their forecasts regarding the second
period play.
At date t=2 and if there is a new product in the market, the new (2) and
the old (1) customers make their purchasing decisions after they observe the
rival rmsprices. Old customerspurchasing decision, given announced prices,
resembles a coordination game and can have multiple equilibria. Following the
13See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) for a paper where backward compatibility and forward
incompatibility are present.
14Zero marginal cost is consistent with the applications in the computer software market
industry.
15Note that the utility function may not be necessarily linear in income (any monotonic
transformation would su¢ ce) but linear utility simplies the analysis.
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literature, old consumers may be able to coordinate either to the Pareto optimal
outcome or to what all the members of their class prefer.16 In the similar coordi-
nation problem related to the new customerspurchasing decisions, the standard
assumption is that buyers with the same preferences act as if they were a single
player. Thus, after observing the prices, they coordinate to what is best for all
of them. Since price discrimination is possible, both competitors can o¤er lower
prices to old customers. We restrict attention to pure rmsstrategies and all
consumers make their purchasing decisions simultaneously while we assume that
they decide to purchase a superior product rather than an old version and join a
network of superior rather than a smaller size even when their net utility may be
equivalent. We also assume the same discount factor  for all the agents in the
economy.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the agentsmoves.
3.3 Market outcome
In this section, we will solve for equilibrium outcomes; that is, rmsinvestment
decisions, their prices in both the rst and the second period as well as customers
choices. We will start our analysis by considering the case where compatibility is
mandatory.
16See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the agentsmoves where D stands for the dominant rm
and R for the rival.
3.3.1 Mandatory compatibility
We will solve the model using backwards induction, starting from the second
period rmspricing decisions (t = 2), going back to calculating the dominant
rms price for his initial version of quality q1 (t = 1) as well as the competitors
optimal investment and compatibility decisions (t = 0).
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3.3.1.1 Second period (t = 2)
Imagine that both rms innovate and think rst of the new customers (2) who
join a network of maximum size independently of where they purchase their new
product of quality q2. Thus, given the competitors prices and if we restrict
attention to linear utility in income, their utility by purchasing any of the two
new products is q2 +    c   p22i; after normalizing the second period market
size to unity where the three subscripts in the price charged denote the quality
of the product (q2), the type of consumers (2) and the product maker (i = 1
for the leader and i = 2 for the smaller rival), respectively. If all these customers
purchase the dominant rms initial version, their utility given his price p12 is
q1 + 1x1 + 2   c   p12, where x1 is the 1 customersfraction that sticks to
q1.
Old customers (1) observe the prices set by the competitors and their utility
is q2+ cu p21i; if they buy q2 from competitor i and q1+1x1+2x2 if they
stick to the product of quality q117, where x1; x2 are the customersfractions that
either stick or buy q1 in the second period. If old customers make their purchasing
decisions independently of what other old customers do, they will buy either the
dominant or the smaller rms product when:
p21i  q + 2(1  x2)  cu; 8i = 1; 2:18
17These customers are induced to buy the initial product of quality q1 at t = 1 (see the
Appendix for the rst period analysis).
18See the Appendix for the prices these customers are willing to pay if they coordinate to
what all the other members of their class prefer.
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We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (A1): q + 2x2   cu  0; 0  x2  1:
This assumption says that the old second period customersexpected benet
from buying any new product is at least greater than the cost of learning how to
use it and allows us to isolate the role of network externalities and the expected
quality improvements in rmsstrategies and welfare.
Thus, in such a case, all customers buy or purchase any new version for free
due to Bertrand competition.
If only the dominant rm innovates, he remains the sole supplier in both
periods. Thus, given his prices, new customersutility if they purchase the new
product (q2) is q2 +  c  p221; while if they all buy his initial version (q1), their
utility is q1 + 1x1 + 2  c  p121; where x1 is the old customersfraction that
sticks to the initial version. Old customersutility if they upgrade to the dominant
rms q2 is q2 + a  cu   p211 while their utility if they stick to the old version is
q1+1x1+2x2: If these customers coordinate on the Pareto optimal outcome,
they will buy the new product even if everyone else sticks to q1 (x1 = 1) if:
p211  q + 2(1  x2)  cu:
Thus, since the dominant rms second period prot is a decreasing function of
the number of new customers who stick to the initial version, the market leaders
optimal choice is to stop selling his initial version and the prices he charges to
customers are p221 = q2 +   c; p211 = q + 2   cu:
83
When the rival rm is the sole inventor, the dominant rm can no longer
stop selling his initial version in the second period as such a choice would imply a
potentially collusive behaviour. Thus, in this scenario, the competitorsoptimal
prices are p222 = q + 1; p121 = 0; p212 = q + 2   cu and all customers buy
the rival rms innovative product.
The last case occurs when none of the competitors innovates where the new
customers face a price p121 = q1 + a  c from the dominant rm which extracts all
their surplus.19
3.3.1.2 First and initial period (t = 1 and t = 0)
In the rst period (t = 1), the dominant rm decides on the optimal price of his
initial version of quality q1 wishing to extract consumerstotal expected surplus
and potential buyers (1) make their purchasing decisions, depending on their
expectations regarding the market participantssecond period behaviour.
Moving to the initial period (t = 0), both rms decide their optimal investment
taking into consideration that the rival is also maximising his/her expected total
prots.20 We will consider the following possible scenarios:
Scenario 2 (A2): qe < 1; qe  1cu: This scenario occurs when the
expected quality improvement is smaller relative to the network e¤ects.
Scenario 3 (A3): qe > 1; qe  1cu: In this case, the expected quality
19See the Appendix for the table containing the second period prices in the di¤erent scenarios.
20See the Appendix for the rivals maximization problems and their optimal investment levels.
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improvement is larger than the extent of network externalities.
The next lemma summarizes the market equilibrium outcome when compati-
bility is mandatory:
Lemma 14 Both competitors optimal choice is to invest into developping the
product of quality q2: If A2 holds, the dominant rms investment decision is an
increasing function of the rivals optimal choice. When A3 holds, the dominant
rms investment is a decreasing function of the rivals optimal choice. Customers
in the rst period purchase the product of quality q1 and in the second, the whole
market purhases the superior product of quality q2.
When network e¤ects are larger than the expected quality improvement (A2),
the dominant rms reaction function is an increasing function of the rivals in-
vestment decision.21 On the other hand, when network e¤ects are relatively weak
(A3), the dominant rm seems to free ride on the rivals investment choice as his
expected second period benet by increasing his probability of success would be
outweighed by the additional rst period cost.
3.3.2 Laissez faire Competition Law
Under a laissez faire competition law, both rms initially choose their investment
levels as well as whether they will support compatibility in the future period.
21See the Appendix for the graphical representation of the di¤erent cases.
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3.3.2.1 Second period (t = 2)
Think rst of the scenario where only the rival innovates and consider the new
second period customers (2). After they observe the prices, if they all purchase
the rivals product of quality q2; their utility is q2 + 2 + 1(1  x1)  c  p222,
where 1   x1 is the old customersfraction that purchases q2: If they all buy q1;
their utility is q1+2+1x1  c p121: Thus, these customers prefer the rivals
superior product of quality q2 if:
p222   p121  q + 1(1  2x1):
Old customers also observe the prices and decide whether to buy the superior
product or stick to the initial version.22 If they purchase q2; their utility is q2 +
1(1   x1) + 2(1   x2)   cu   p212 while if they stick to q1; their utility is
q1 + 1x1 + 2x2; where x1; x2 are the old and new customersfractions that
stick or buy q1; respectively. If these customers coordinate on the Pareto optimal
outcome, they will buy q2 even when all the other old customers stick to q1 if:
p212  q + 2(1  2x2)  1   cu:23
We will consider the following two scenarios:
Scenario 4 (A4): q+2 1 cu < 0. In this scenario and in equilibrium,
old customers do not buy the rivals product of quality q2 as they are better-o¤
22We consider here that these customers were already induced to buy q1 in the previous period
(see the Appendix):
23See the Appendix for the price these customers are willing to pay to purchase the product
of quality q1 if they coordinate to what all the other members of their class prefer.
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by retaining the dominant rms initial version.
Scenario 5 (A5): q+2 1  cu > 0. In this case and in equilibrium,
the rst period customers are better o¤by purchasing the rival rms new product.
If the quality improvement from the rivals new product is relatively small
(A4), new customers prefer the product of quality q2 if:
p222   p121  q   1;
and thus, the optimal rmsprices are: p222 = q   1; p121 = 0:
If old customers buy the rivals version (A5 holds), new customers prefer the
new product rather than the old if:
p222   p121  q + 1;
and the competitors optimal choices are: p222 = q + 1; p121 = 0; p212 =
q + 2   1   cu:
In the scenario that both competitorsR&D processes are successful, consider
rst the new customers. After they observe the competitorsprices, their utility if
they all purchase the dominant rms or the rivals q2 is q2+2+1x1 c p221;
q2+2+1x
0
1 c p222; respectively, where x1; x01 are the old customersfractions
that belong to either of the rivalsnetwork. If they all buy the dominant rms
initial version, their utility is q1 + 2+ 1(1  x1   x01)  c  p121: Thus, these
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customers will choose to purchase the dominant rms superior product if:
q2 + 2 + 1x1   c  p221 
 maxfq2 + 2 + 1x01   c  p222; q1 + 2 + 1(1  x1   x
0
1)  c  p121g
Moving our attention to the old customers, their utility if they purchase q2 from
either the dominant or the rival rm is q2+2x2+1x1 cu p211; q2+2x02+
1x
0
1   cu   p212; respectively while if they stick to the initial version q1; their
utility is q1 + 2(1  x2   x02) + 1(1  x1   x01): Thus, they will choose to buy
the dominant rms product of quality q2 even if all the other old customers either
stick to the initial version or buy the rivals new version if:
q2 + 2x2   cu   p211  q2 + 1 + 2x02   cu   p212
and
q2 + 1 + 2x2   cu   p211  q1 + 1 + 2(1  x2   x02):
Note that when A4 holds and old customers coordinate on the Pareto optimum,
their utility if they purchase the rivals product of quality q2 is not an option for
them as it is strictly dominated by their alternative of sticking to q1. The dominant
rms optimal choice is to stop selling the initial version to the new second period
customers, the equilibrium prices are p221 = 1; p222 = 0; p211 = q + 2   cu
and all customers buy the dominant rms superior product. When A5 holds,
the whole market buys either the rivals or the dominant rms new version and
Bertrand competition drives all prices to zero.
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The scenarios where the dominant rm is the only innovator as well as the
case where no rms R&D process is successful lead to the same market outcome
as in the economy that operates under mandatory compatibility.24
3.3.2.2 First and initial period (t = 1 and t = 0)
In the rst period (t = 1), the dominant rm decides the optimal price of his
initial version of quality q1 wishing to extract customersexpected total surplus
and potential buyers (1) make their purchasing decisions, depending on their
expectations regarding the market participantssecond period behaviour.
Moving to the initial period (t = 0), both competitors choose their investment
levels aiming to maximise their expected prots.25
The next proposition summarizes the market equilibrium outcome in an econ-
omy that operates under a laissez faire Competition Law:26
Proposition 15 (a) For relatively less innovative future products (A4), the dom-
inant rms optimal choice is not to support compatibility. (b) For su¢ ciently
innovative products (A5): (1) both rms welcome compatibility for a relatively
large initial market size (1), (2) if the rst period market size is relatively small,
the rival rejects to o¤er interoperability information to the initial market leader.
24See the Appendix for the table containing the equilibrium second period prices under the
di¤erent scenarios.
25See the Appendix for the competitorsmaximization problems and their optimal investment
choices as functions of the rivals optimal choice.
26Note that the dominant rm would be indi¤erent between supporting and impeding com-
patibility if old consumers coordinate to what all the other old consumers prefer.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
For less innovative products (A4), incompatibility prevails in the market as
the dominant rm prefers not to share his network with the smaller innovative
rival. More precisely, for relatively weak network e¤ects (A3) and unlike the rival,
the dominant rm invests more under incompatibility while for stronger network
externalities (A2), the dominant rm would have invested more if compatibility
was compulsory.27 On the other hand, for su¢ ciently innovative products relative
to network externalities (A5), the dominant rm both welcomes compatibility and
invests more even if the rival is a direct future competitor. This happens as the
gains from sharing its network outweigh the potential costs: more precisely, by
supporting compatibility, the probability that he is the only inventor increases
allowing him to enjoy a larger second period expected prot exceeding the loss
from a lower rst period prot. The rival faces a trade-o¤: if she supports com-
patibility, the probability of being the sole second period supplier decreases while
it allows her to set a higher price to existing customers (1). Thus, for a relatively
large rst period market size, her optimal choice is to o¤er compatibility to the
market leader (b1). In a such a case, she also invests more than in a economy that
incompatibility is mandatory. When the number of old customers is smaller (b2),
unlike the dominant rm, the rival is better-o¤ by not supplying interoperability
information to the initial market leader.
27See gures 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
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3.4 Social Welfare Maximization
We consider the problem faced by a social planner who wishes to maximise the sum
of consumersand producerstotal discounted expected surplus. He has access
to the rmscost functions and can invest into the two research lines as well as
choose his attitude towards compatibility.28
If the planner supports compatibility, all customers are expected to buy the
improved version of quality q2 in the second period (A1), joining a network of
maximum size. For less innovative products (A4) and unlike the case where in-
novations are relatively important (A5), if compatibility is not supported, old
customers only buy the Research line 1 new version.
The next proposition summarizes the socially optimal investment and com-
patibility choice and provides a comparison with the market equilibrium obtained
in an economy operating under mandatory compatibility or a laissez faire compe-
tition law:
Proposition 16 a) If A4 and A2 hold, the social planner decides to support com-
patibility. Although the economy that operates under mandatory compatibility leads
to overinvestment while a laissez faire competition law may lead to underinvest-
ment, the laissez faire Competition Law is socially preferable. b) If A4 and A3
hold, the planner may choose to support compatibility. The market equilibrium
28We call the initial line whose past R&D success produces q1 as Research line 1.
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outcome in a laissez faire economy leads to incompatibility and is always socially
preferable compared to the market equilibrium under mandatory compatibility. c)
If A5 holds, the planner is indi¤erent between supporting and impeding compati-
bility.
Proof. See the Appendix
For less innovative products (A4), although a laissez faire economy leads to the
dominant rm rejecting compatibility, the magnitude of the potential ine¢ ciency
is smaller compared to the economy that operates under mandatory compatibility.
In particular, when network e¤ects are relatively weak (A3), a laissez faire compe-
tition law leads to more balanced R&D incentives for both rivals and is certainly
socially preferable compared to the economy that mandates compatibility where
the dominant rm underivensts and the rival overinvests heavily.29 Similarly, when
network externalities are relatively stronger (A2), a market where interoperabil-
ity is compulsory leads to overinvestment and a laissez faire competition law is
socially preferable although the rival is deterred to invest.30
In conclusion, we could say that a Laissez faire Competition Law is socially
preferable compared to an economy that either mandates compatibility or imposes
very strong intellectual property rights.
29See gure 3 in the Appendix.
30See gure 2 in the Appendix.
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3.5 Conclusion
The rst contribution of this work is that we give an alternative explanation as
to why dominant rms may welcome compatibility. More precisely, we show that
sequential innovation and su¢ ciently innovative products in an economy with
durable network goods allow the market leader to voluntarily supply interoper-
ability information even to direct future competitors. In fact, when compatibility
is present, the dominant rm invests more increasing its probability of success as
well as the probability that it is the only inventor in the market. On the other
hand, the rivals optimal choice depends on the market size: if the number of
initial customers is su¢ ciently large, she will also support compatibility while this
is no longer true for a smaller initial market size.
Our second contribution relates to the dominant rms R&D incentives, as we
show that they are not curbed under incompatibility for less innovative products.
In particular, we nd a critical cuto¤ in network externalities below which the
market leader invests more when refusing to support compatibility with his future
potential rival.
Third, we hope to contribute to the discussion concerning the social desirabil-
ity of a more interventionist competition law: we nd that when network e¤ects
are weak, a laissez faire competition law is socially preferable compared to an econ-
omy that operates under mandatory compatibility, as a laissez faire market either
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converges to compatibility or when this does not occur, incompatibility is socially
benecial. When network externalities are strong, unlike a laissez faire market, an
economy that operates under mandatory compatibility leads to overinvestment.
We acknowledge the limitations of this piece of research. First, current work
considers the interaction of di¤erent business models when the quality improve-
ment is endogenous and is not modelled as a parameter when network e¤ects and
durability are present. Further research may also analyze the competitorsR&D
incentives and compatibility decisions in the face of stochastic demand.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Tables regarding the second period prices
The next table summarizes the di¤erent potential cases as well as the rivals
optimal second period prices charged to the new and the old customers under
compatibility:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p22i = 0; 8i = 1; 2 p21i = 0; 8i = 1; 2
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q + 1 p212 = q + 2   cu
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
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Under mandatory incompatibility, the following table summarizes all the po-
tential second period cases as well as the rivalsprices to the di¤erent customers
classes under A4 when both rms invest into producing an improved version of
quality q2:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p221 = 1 p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q   1 p212 = 0
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
while under A5, the table becomes:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p222 = 0; p221 = 0 p21i = 0; 8i = 1; 2
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q + 1 p212 = q + 2   1   cu
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
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3.6.2 Calculating rmsinvestment decisions as a function of the
rivals optimal choices
3.6.2.1 Mandatory compatibility
Given the market leaders price (p11), rst period customers total discounted
expected utility if they purchase the product q1 is:
q1 + 1   c+ s1(1  s2)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) +
+(1  s1)s2(qe2 +   cu   pe212) + s1s2(qe2 + a  cu) +
+(1  s1)(1  s2)(q1 + a)  p11;
where s1; s2 are the dominant rms and the rivals probabilities of successfully
innovating, respectively and the subsrcipt e denotes the expectation for the quality
improvement and the second period prices. Note that the market leader wishes to
extract 1 customersexpected total surplus by setting the highest price p11 that
would induce them to buy q1 and thus, his optimal rst period choice is:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s1(1  s2)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) + (1  s1)s2(qe2 +   cu   pe212) +
+s1s2(q
e
2 + a  cu) + (1  s1)(1  s2)(q1 + a): (1)
Moving back to the initial period (t = 0), the two rms simultaneously choose
their investment levels. Thus, the smaller rms maximization problem is:
max
s20
8>><>>:
s2(1  s1)(2p222 + 1p212)  s22=2 if s2 > 0
0; otherwise
9>>=>>; : (2)
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The similar maximization problem for the dominant rm is:
max
s10
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1p11 + 1s1(1  s2)p211 + 2s1(1  s2)p221+
+2(1  s1)(1  s2)p121   s21=2; if s1 > 0
1p11 + 2(1  s2)p121; otherwise
;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(3)
where p11 is given in (1) and s2 is the rivals optimal investment choice.
The rival and the dominant rms investment decisions as a function of the
competitors optimal choice are:
s2 = (1  s1)(qe + 212   1cu); (4)
s1 =  s2(2qe   12) + (qe   1cu); (5)
respectively.
3.6.2.2 Mandatory incompatibility
If A4 holds, the rivals optimization problem is:
max
s40
8>><>>:
(1  s3)s42pe222   s24=2; if s4 > 0
0; otherwise
9>>=>>; ; (6)
where s4 is her investment choice and s3 is the dominant rms optimal investment
decision. The similar maximization problem faced by the market leader is:
max
s30
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1p11 + 1s3(1  s4)pe211 + 2s3(1  s4)pe221+
+2(1  s3)(1  s4)pe121 + 2s3s41   s23=2; if s3 > 0
1p11 + 2(1  s4)pe121; otherwise
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(7)
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where the price p11 extracts the rst period customers expected surplus and is
given by the expression:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s3(1  s4)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) + s3s4(qe2 +   cu   pe211) +(8)
+(1  s3)(1  s4)(q1 + ) + (1  s3)s4(q1 + 1):
When old customers expect to purchase the product of quality q2 in the sec-
ond period independently of which rm innovates (A5 holds), the competitors
problems become:
max
s40
s4(1  s3)(2pe222 + 1pe212)  s24=2; (6)
max
s30
1p11 + 1s3(1  s4)pe211 + 2s3(1  s

4)p
e
221 + (7)
+2(1  s3)(1  s4)pe121   s23=2;
for the rival and the dominant rm, respectively and the rst period price is:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s3(1  s4)(q1 + 1) + s3s4(qe2   cu) + (9)
+(1  s3)(1  s4)(q1 + ) + (1  s3)s4(q1 + 21):
Note that when both rmsR&D is successful, all customers are expected to buy
the product of quality qe2 from either of the incompatible competitors. Thus, they
will be part of a network of size x, with x being any non-negative number. Thus,
in the rst period, the dominant rm may risk losing these customers if he charges
a price greater than p11 dened above.
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3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 15
a) If A3 and A4 hold, the dominant rm always refuses to support compatibility.
To see this, let E(no compatibility)=f(s) and E(compatibility)=g(s) denote the domi-
nant rms expected prot under incompatibility and compatibility, respectively,
where f(0)>g(0).
We take the derivative of the two functions with respect to the dominant
rms choice (s): fs =  [s4(qe   12   1cu)   (qe   1cu)]   s while
gs = [q
e   1cu   s22(qe   1)]   s; where s4; s2 are the rivals optimal
choices under incompatibility and compatibility, respectively (see gure 3).
The dominant rm is better-o¤ by not supporting compatibility when:
s22(q
e   1)  s4(qe   12   1cu) > 0; (*)
where the rivals choices lie on the lines:
s2 = (1  s)(qe + 212   1cu); and s4 = (1  s)2(qe   1):
Without loss of generality, we assume that the discount factor is large ( = 1):
After substituting s2 and s4 in * we get:
(1 s)(qe+212 1cu)2(qe 1) (1 s)2(qe 1)(qe 12 1cu) > 0
which always holds and thus fs > gs 8s:
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After solving for s1; s

3; one gets:
s1 =
qe   1cu   (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
and
s3 =
qe   1cu   (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
and after substituting to the expressions for s2; s

4; we get:
s2 = [1 
qe   1cu   (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21) ](q
e+212 1cu)
and
s4 = [1 
qe   1cu   (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21) ]2(q
e   1):
Thus, * becomes after some algebraic manipulation:
(qe + 212   1cu)[1  (qe   12   1cu)2(qe   1)] >
(qe   12   1cu)[1  (qe + 212   1cu)2(qe   1)]
which simply veries that s3 > s

1:
Thus, the dominant rm impedes compatibility.
Note that if A4 and A2 hold, the rivals optimal choice is not to invest (s4 = 0)
and the dominant rm chooses not to support compatibility. Think for example
the following parameter values that satisfy A4 and A2: qe = 0:3;  = 1; 1 = 0:7;
2 = 0:3; cu = 0:1; c = 0:2; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 0:4;  = 1: Direct comparison of
the dominant rms values of maximised expected prot show that he impedes
compatibility.
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b1) Think for the example the case where: qe = 0:9;  = 1; 1 = 0:8;
2 = 0:2; cu = 0:2; c = 0:3; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 1;  = 1.
Direct comparison of the two rmsexpected prots lead to the conclusion
that they both support compatibility.
b2) Think of the parameter values: qe = 0:4;  = 1; 1 = 0:3; 2 = 0:7;
cu = 0:2; c = 0:3; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 0:5;  = 1.
Direct comparison of the rmsexpected prots yields that the dominant rm
supports compatibility while the rival rm rejects it.
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3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 16
Depending on whether the planner invests or not and whether he supports com-
patibility or not, the social welfare function if A4 holds is:
max
;00
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1(q1 + 1   c) + 1(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   cu)+
1(1  )(1  0)(q1 + ) + 2(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   c)+
+2(1  )(1  0)(q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2; ; 0 > 0 if he supports
compatibility,
1(q1 + 1   c) + 1(qe2 +   cu) + 10(1  )(q1 + 1)+
+1(1  )(1  0)(q1 + ) + 2(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   c)+
+2(1  )(1  0)(q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2; ; 0 > 0 if he
does not support compatibility,
1(q1 + 1   c+ q1 + ) + 2(q1 +   c);  = 0 = 0;
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
;
(10)
where ; 
0
are the planners investment choices in Research lines 1 and 2, respec-
tively.
a) If A4 and A2 hold, the social planner will make the two products in the
second period compatible if the maximum value of the social welfare function is
higher compared to the scenario he makes incompatible products. If max SWcom;
maxSWincom are the highest values in the social welfare if he supports compat-
ibility or not, it is immediate to see that in the latter case, he only invests in
improving the dominant rms product.
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The planner supports compatibility when:
maxSWcom > maxSWincom
or equivalently when the expression:
1(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   cu) + 1[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(q1 + )] +
2(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   c) + 2[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(q1 +   c)]
is positive, where ; 
0
are his optimal investment choices when he chooses com-
patibility and 
00
is his optimal investment if he chooses to have incompatible
products satisfying the equations:
 =  0(qe   1cu) + (qe   1cu);

0
=  (qe   1cu) + (qe   1cu);

00
= (qe   1cu):
Note that  = 
0
= 
+1
; where  = (qe   1cu); 0 <  < 1 :
Thus, we need to show that:
1f( 2
+ 1
  
2
(+ 1)2
  )(qe2 +   cu) + [(1 

+ 1
)2   (1  )](q1 + )]g+
2f( 2
+ 1
  
2
(+ 1)2
 )(qe2+ c)+[(1 

+ 1
)2 (1 )](q1+ c)g 2 
2
(+ 1)2
+2 > 0
or equivalently:
1
1  2   
(+ 1)2
(qe   cu) + 21  
2   
(+ 1)2
qe + 2   2
2
(+ 1)2
> 0:
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For parameter values satisfying A1, A2, A4, the above expression takes a positive
sign. Think for example the parameter values satisfying A1, A2 and A4 ( = 1;
1 = 0:7; q
e = 0:3; cu = 0:01). Direct calculation leads to the conclusion that
the above expression is positive and thus the planner chooses compatibility.
b) If A4 and A3 hold, the social planner decides to support compatibility if:
maxSWcom > maxSWincom
or equivalently the expression:
1(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   cu) + 1[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(1  000)](q1 + ) 
 1000(1  00)(q1 + 1) + 2(+ 0   0   00   000 + 00000)(qe2 +   c) +
+2[(1  )(1  0)  (1  00)(1  000)](q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2  002=2  0002=2
takes a positive sign. It is straightforward to see that for parameter values
satisfying A4 and A3 (for example, take qe = 0:4; 1 = 0:7;  = 0:5;  = 1;
c = 0:4; cu = 0:3; q1 = 0:1), the planner supports compatibility as the social
welfare function is maximised.
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3.6.5 Figures regarding the competitorsand the planners optimal
investment decisions
The next gures summarize the market equilibrium outcome under a laissez faire
Competition Law and under mandatory compatibility as well the social optimum
level of investment:
Figure 3.2: A4 and A2
3.7 Abbreviations
ECIS: European Committee of Interoperable Systems
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Figure 3.3: A4 and A3
R&D: Research and Development
IPRs: Intellectual Property Rights
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